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ABSTRACT

Economics is supposed to fall somewhere between a hard science and a social
science. During the last half century, economics has become highly mathematical
trying to mimic physics. The purpose of this study is to look at the metaphysical
statements linked to mathematical models, specifically, Game Theory. In doing so, it
will be demonstrated that Game Theory, as part of neoclassical economics, engages in
analysis which can be categorized as metaphysical, with real metaphysical
implications. In categorizing the metaphysical assumptions of neoclassical
economists/game theorists we will see how much of their analysis is consists in a
reductive, implausible metaphysical view. Problems that arise from this view are
hardly taken into consideration most economists. This lack of consideration has nontrivial consequences for economics as a discipline and for its methodology.
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1. Introduction
The present study of economics has become increasingly reliant on extensive
use of mathematics. This use of mathematics in economics requires one to forgo the
otherwise rigorous analysis that one requires when using philosophy, and its relation
to other disciplines, in particular, economics. Economists tend to overlook some
statements that can be deemed philosophical. The purpose of this study is to capture
some of the “philosophical presuppositions” in economics that might affect its
theoretical coherence. Economic ontology (the study of beings as they relate to the
economy and their behavior in the world) are increasingly becoming areas of inquiry
in relation to economic theory.1 Economic Ontology seeks to uncover those
“philosophical [ontological] presuppositions” that lie at the bottom of economic
theory.2 Uskali Mäki cites the Duhem-Quine thesis as an example of how
mathematics and the use of empirical methods might affect the conclusions by
economists and scientists. The Duhem-Quine thesis states that scientific theories are
not able to be “proven” based on the results from empirical testing.3 Thus, Mäki
states, the results from empirical testing are not able to discriminate among
competing theories—that is, results are not able to establish the merits, or demerits of
a certain scientific (and economic) theory.4

The purpose of philosophical

considerations is not only to question the foundations on which mainstream economic

1

The Economic World View, Studies in the Ontology of Economics presents a series of essays that deal
with some of the main issues (or philosophical presuppositions) in various areas of economics.
2

See Uskali Mäki, “The what, why, and how of Economic Ontology,” pg. 10.

3

See Ibid. pg. 9

4

Ibid. pg. 9
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analysis is done, but also to better our understanding of the world. This paper argues
that the mere use of mathematics is not sufficient as a justification of economic
arguments.5
The need to look outside economic analysis is imperative to have a more
sound economic view of the world. Some practicing economists/applied
mathematicians state that they do not make “metaphysical” statements without
realizing that mathematics, as well as natural science is founded on certain
“metaphysical” statements. Martin Heidegger’s essay “Modern Science,
Metaphysics, and Mathematics” states precisely how the history of science is founded
upon seemingly “evident” truths that Isaac Newton inherits from philosophers going
back to Aristotle and other Greeks.6 Metaphysics, that which is beyond the physical
(constituted of space and time) is inherently present in the study of motion; it is
arguably the case that thought/thinking are also metaphysical “things.” The different
stages of history will affect theories of motion (that of Aristotle, or that of Newton).
Heidegger’s analysis of the “mathematical” starts by presenting the etymology of the
word mathematics. Mathematics, he states, has to do with “number,” but this is an
inherently narrow definition of the mathematical. Ta mathēmata, that which can be
learned, and mathēsis—that which can be taught, is at the foundation of
“mathematics.” What can be learned and what can be taught, for Heidegger, is a

5

Mäki suggests that it is indeed to uncover the limitations of scientific/economic theories that lead us
to a more coherent view of the world—only after we have discovered such limitations we can “justify”
the merits of any given theory (pg. 10).
6

See Martin Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics,” pp. 281-288.

2

philosophical problem which deals in deciphering the “thingness of things.”7 What is
it about mathematics that helps us decipher the “thingness of things.” When we
answer the question about numbers, and their relation to the “thingness of things,” it
is possible, according to Heidegger, to do the learning. The number 3, he states, is a
seemingly simple concept already at hand for us to analyze. When we see three
chairs, he states, we immediately see the number three. Conversely, when we try to
grasp the concept of “threeness,” we are left to referring to the natural series of
natural numbers.8 What Heidegger points out using this example is that there are two
senses of the “mathematical.” The first sense of the mathematical is that which is
learnable and comes naturally from observation. But the second sense of the
“mathematical” is
the manner of learning and the process itself[;] [t]he mathematical is that
evident aspect of things within which we are always already moving and
according to which we experience them as things at all, and as such things.
The mathematical is this fundamental position we take toward things by
which we take up things as already given to us, and as they must and should
be given. The mathematical is thus the fundamental presupposition of the
knowledge of things.9
7

Ibid. pg. 274, This seemingly odd formulation has to do with the world as we encounter it. The
philosopher’s task is to try to decipher the world. Heidegger cites five different areas in connection
with ta mathēmata:
1) Ta physica: things insofar as they originate and come forth from themselves
2) Ta poioumena: things insofar as they are produced by humans and exist as such
3) Ta chrēmata: things insofar as they are in use or subsist at our disposal—these might be any
object relating to ta physica or ta poioumena such as rocks, or in the case of poioumena,
anything we might make
4) Ta pragmata: things insofar as we encounter them at all, whether we use them, work on them,
transform them.
5) Ta mathēmata: what can be learned insofar as 1-4.
8

Ibid. pg. 277

9

Ibid. pp. 277-278, Heidegger cites the sign at the entrance of Plato’s academy stating: “Let no one
enter who has not grasped the meaning of the mathematical.” This reference relates clearly to the
conception of the mathematical strictly relating to number and the need to go beyond this
understanding.

3

If we take Heidegger’s formulation of the mathematical, we see clearly that the
mathematical itself is not a simple set of numerical relations. What does the
“knowledge of things” entail? Heidegger points out that the project of the
mathematical (conceptualized in the manner of that which goes beyond number), is to
project things as they first show themselves (as in the example of 3 chairs being just
there). The project of the mathematical is axiomatic—that is the mathematical
project sets out to make statements about the world from fundamental propositions.
These fundamental propositions are set out in advance in order for the experimenter
to have access to this (mathematical) axiomatic project.10 This is the mathematical
system developed by Newtonian mechanics (relating to the motion of bodies), or the
infinitesimal calculus of Leibniz. The relations of objects are analyzed by a closed
system that is coherent and is developed from axioms. “Knowledge of things” in the
case of Newtonian mechanics, or infinitesimal calculus, attempts to give rise to
knowledge of things generally; but in both cases, according to Heidegger, we have
the “narrow” sense of mathematics at work.11 Heidegger states that the ‘calculation’
which is the result from the mathematical formalism and intuitive determination of
things has given modern science (economics is mentioned only in passing) its status
of stature. In reality, the “burning questions” about things, and specifically beings
remain unanswered and unquestioned.12 If we are to dig deep into the foundations of

10

11

12

Ibid. pp. 291-292
Ibid. pg. 297
Ibid. pg. 296
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mathematics and its relation to other sciences, it is only through metaphysics that this
can be done—this is so because metaphysics reaches farthest not only to beings or
things, but to beings in totality.13
What exactly does metaphysics mean to economics? The way in which
economists construe agents and economic structures will have implications as to what
predictions will come from within the specific economic presuppositions. This
applies not only for economists, but also other social scientists that make statements
about complex human reality. From this complex human reality, it follows that the
structures in which humans exist are also complex and have an impact on how
scientists and economists do science. Sections 2-3 state that mathematics could be
the foundation of economic analysis, but it is only through an inherently metaphysical
analysis that allows us to posit this mathematical foundation. Section 4 on economic
methodology tries to show the lack of progression in the mainstream economics with
regards to methodological issues that affect economic analysis. Section 5 deals with
the current view of mainstream economics which involves rigorous “mathematical
formulations,” but its assumptions about individuals in an economy is far from
economic reality. Section 6 challenges mainstream economic theory with respect to
value among other things. This whole of this study involves a truly interdisciplinary
approach utilizing psychology, economics, philosophy and history. Thus, the study
of economics is not merely the study of “economic agents” all of whom can be
reduced to mathematical algorithms (determined and deterministic calculations).
Economics is not only about making tractable formulations, abstracted from any type
13

Ibid. pg. 296
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of worldly reality. Knowing how these formulations come to be will help us
understand the how radical our conclusions might be in relation to history, science,
philosophy and the development of knowledge (and the lack of it).
2. Kant and the Possibility for a Science
Kant’s genius allowed him to ponder the question whether philosophy could
ground itself like a science in order for knowledge to be possible. Kant’s idea for
philosophy does not rely on a form of metaphysics from which all positings are
derived. Mathematics, for example, seems to be an important case for the
philosopher of science to ponder in order to dismantle the metaphysics that go with
the grounding that is given to some metaphysical forms of mathematics.
Mathematics is possible formulated as idealism. That is, mathematical objects exist
outside of the mind, and therefore they are independent of human positing for
existence. Plato is the main influence in the history of philosophy to bring forth such
a foundation to philosophical thought. And although Plato’s view provided a great
deal of insight on philosophical questions, it allows for a metaphysics which posits
objects outside of the realm of experience; something which ultimately is (according
to Kant) ‘spurious metaphysics.’ According to Kant, time & space are ‘pure
sensibilities’ which must ground logic. That is, it is impossible to come to a
conclusive positing about objects outside of space & time. For systems of
mathematics, what follows from this is that mathematical objects viewed as
independent entities become another form of spurious metaphysics. Kant’s insight
about the way in which we ground our epistemology will impact the type of
philosophy and science (including mathematics and natural science). If we want to
6

steer away from spurious metaphysics, Kant’s epistemology must be carefully
examined against other forms of idealism, and this, will be the ground for philosophy,
and ultimately other sciences.
In order to posit the existence of something, first, that object must lie within
space & time. Plato’s strong disagreement against Kant lies in the fact that, if we
posit objects inside of space & time, we will not really ground anything because of
the unreliability of the senses, from which we experience objects. Thus the great
disagreement between Plato and Kant is about the senses. Plato requires positing
objects outside of space & time in order to make these objects unchanging. Thus,
Plato would view Kant’s “psychologism” as unreliable because Plato views the
senses as an unreliable mechanism through which we can come to “know” things.14
The clearest statement for the integration of mathematics as a ground for a
science is in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Kant’s Transcendental
Aesthetic reformulates the problem of dogmatism and empiricism. Kant’s
reformulation of the empiricist/dogmatic opposition leads to a philosophical view that
allows truth with certainty without having to refer to any spurious metaphysics.
2. 1 Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
According to Kant, Idealism has some general characteristics. Idealism states
objects exist “in-themselves” outside of space & time, and therefore outside any
possibility of experience; furthermore, it is impossible to provide any proof for the
existence of such objects. The two examples provided by Kant are Descartes
14

Plato ultimately thinks that we cannot know anything. But this follows clearly from the view that
there are these immutable objects outside of space & time which can not be “known.” Plato thinks that
things in the world of space & time “participate” in the universal forms (See Naomi Reshotko,
unpublished manuscript, “Plato's Epistemological Paradox: The Knowable Cannot be Known”).

7

“material idealism” and Berkeley’s “dogmatic idealism. Kant observes that
Berkeley’s idealism is problematic in general because it assumes that space is
imaginary. What follows from this assumption is that objects in space are also
imaginary.15 Thus, there are only imaginary objects in the world, and we never know
what they are.16 It is clear that Berkeley’s idealism is too problematic to defend in
any length. The “Material Idealism” of Descartes is not a better formulation of the
problem of knowledge according to Kant. Descartes’ idealism, according to Kant, is
no better than Berkeley’s idealism. Descartes wants to prove existence by assuming
external existence (non-imaginary); proof of external existence allows for Descartes
to posit the ‘I am,’ but nothing more, we are unable, according to Descartes to go
beyond proving our own existence.17
Kant goes on to talk about intuition in idealism. Idealism does not allow a
coherent theory of intuition in order to come to any knowledge. As stated above, any
“knowledge” that we think we have is unstable. This is yet another corollary of
idealism, and the positing of objects outside of space & time. Furthermore, since we
can’t come to know objects directly (through intuition—i.e. Plato), we need to make

15

Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp, B275. Although Plato is not
mentioned in this, we see that Plato’s formulation of Idealism makes this claim as well.
16

Kant provides his own theory on how we gather knowledge of objects in space & time through
intuition (that is, how objects appear to us in their immediacy without going into any technical
philosophical jargon—Plato’s objection to this is that objects in space & time are too unstable, that is
why he want to posit objects outside of space & time, in order to guarantee that not one perception is
what is called “knowledge.” This would be the response by Plato ultimately, for a detailed discussion
see Socratic dialogue, Protagoras.
17

Ibid. B275
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inferences from the objects that appear to us. This inference is supposed to be stable
(see Reshotko’s account of Platonic epistemology mentioned above).18
For Kant, old metaphysics consists of just this lack of distinction between
things-in-themselves, and objects of experience. Things in-themselves are objects
which are unconditioned by the human mind, while objects of appearance are
conditioned objects. Space & time make the dividing line between the unconditioned
and the conditioned. If objects are possible objects of experience, Kant states that
these objects lie in space & time; we can have knowledge about them, and make
knowledge claims. If on the other hand, objects are not possible objects of
experience, then they necessarily lie outside of space & time—and therefore, nothing
can be known about them.19
2.2 Natural Science as Philosophy
The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics presents what Kant’s view of
what a science should be, in connection to positing things in space and time. Before
Kant, science suffers from the over-abundance of metaphysics. The main problem
with this sort of metaphysics is twofold. One the one hand, there is Hume as the main
proponent of the view that it is impossible to come to know anything at all because of
all the flux in the world which constitutes our proximate reality. This reality is
nothing but flux; anything that we come to say about the world is unfounded because

18

Ibid. B291-B294, Reshotko states that it is necessary to “set the bar high” with respect to knowledge,
this guarantees that we have a stable and reliable epistemology. Thus, Ultimately, Kant would be
categorized as a version of Protagoras.

19

Platonists will obviously disagree with this but this is not meant to give an argument against
Platonists. At the conclusion of this section, it will be demonstrated that Kant’s view can be developed
into a metaphysically consistent view with current theories of mathematics (as well as some versions
of Platonism).

9

we do not take into consideration the complexity of a world in flux. The main
consequence of this view is that we are unable to come to any knowledge a priori.
That is, we are unable to come to any knowledge without experience. Furthermore,
we are unable to come to know anything after we ‘experience’ things. Thus, we are
unable to have any cognition whatever.20 Kant’s main problem for philosophy lies in
asking whether it is possible to come to know things a priori, or before experience. In
order to do this Kant sets himself the task to reveal the failure of philosophy before
him. According to Kant, the failure of philosophy before him is due to being trapped
in “spurious metaphysics.” Philosophers before Kant see philosophy as the vehicle to
ultimate truth—Truth as “things-in-themselves.” This kind of philosophizing is what
has allowed for philosophy to be stuck without advancing. Kant’s view of philosophy
comes from the use of the synthetic method as well as the analytic method which will
bring about a “science that shall display all its articulations, as the structure of a quite
peculiar faculty of cognition in its natural combination.”21 For Kant this science is
nearer intuition than other sciences which in the past have attempted such endeavors,
but failed because these sciences have ended up with seemingly coherent metaphysics
of abstract objects.22

20

Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, [4:258], here Kant presents Hume’s
“destructive philosophy” which criticizes any type of metaphysics. Kant very poignantly rejects
Hume’s empiricism. Kant notes that Hume himself is puzzled about the question of metaphysics—
Hume himself falls into a metaphysical trap.
21

Ibid. [4:264]

22

Ibid. Kant does not mention this but we could mention Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz
to mention a few. The rationalists definitely fall under this category. At least the rationalist want a
rigorous way to derive their views, but they also end up with spurious metaphysics because they fail to
make the distinction between the “things-in-themselves” and objects of possible experience.

10

Kant’s complaint against the “old metaphysics” consists in the fact that there
is no necessary link between cognition and objects. Cognition is simply what is
possible to experience in this world. Before Kant, it was necessary to make objects in
the world completely separate entities about which metaphysical statements are
merely assumed. The proofs that follow from these metaphysical statements are
merely a priori; that is, a priori definitions are given, proofs follow from
definitions/axioms, then (propositions) and corollaries from propositions.23 Kant’s
critique of this kind of “proof” and “proving” both are merely theorizing about
“things-in-themselves,” about which for Kant, nothing can be known.
Kant’s response to this “old metaphysics” is to state how it is possible to come
to know things through reason, and be certain that this is actual knowledge (Hume’s
challenge). According to Kant the foundation for anything that can be stated is in
analytic or synthetic judgments. The former is merely explicative and the latter
ampliative.24 Analytic judgments are explicative as they are merely
tautological/definitional statements. Analytic judgments have non-contradiction as
their principle. Synthetic judgments are ampliative in that these statements add
something to our cognition.25 That is, a synthetic judgment adds something to our
knowledge. When I say a triangle is a three sided figure, I am merely restating a fact.
But, when I say that the sum of the internal angles of any triangle is equal to 180˚, I

23

The certainly rigorous example of this is Spinoza’s proof of the existence of God. What is important
to note is how Spinoza is talking about God as a “thing-in-itself.” One of the striking conclusions for
Spinoza is that there is part of the human mind which has an infinite attribute. Otherwise, it would be
impossible to make the connection between the human and the divine.
24

Ibid. [4:266-267]

25

Ibid. [4:267]
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am making a synthetic judgment. For Kant, it is in this way that the structure of
knowledge is constructed. Although analytic judgments are always a priori, and
follow the principle of contradiction, synthetic judgments can be a posteriori.26 All
judgments about experience are synthetic (a posteriori); and without exception
mathematical judgments are synthetic.27 Kant’s famous example of this is in the
arithmetic statement “7+5=12.” Following the foundation that Kant has provided, it
is necessary that we use intuition to start analyzing this problem. We might come to
the realization that this statement is analytic. That is, we simply respond that the
answer is 12. But this is incorrect because if it is the case that we are able to do this,
we should have not problem doing this with larger numbers (where it is clear that
using our hands to count would be quite cumbersome). Thus, this is a synthetic
statement, a priori. That is, we do not need to experience this sum in the world for its
truth to hold. Euclidean Geometry also has this characteristic.28

26

Ibid. [4:267-268] Analytic a posteriori judgments is a null class of judgments, that is it is impossible,
according to Kant, to come to know things are they are in themselves through experience. We note
that in the case of the “old metaphysics” this is not the case since we are able to somehow “know”
these things.
27

Ibid. [4:268] Mathematicians hold that the principle of contradiction is at the bottom of the reliability
of mathematical knowledge. Kant keenly observes that the principle of contradiction only works if we
have another judgment to accompany our analysis; it is not by itself that synthetic judgments (in this
way) work—this only works by presupposing other synthetic propositions.
28

Ibid. [4:268-269] Kant states that it is clear that this statement is synthetic. Kant’s point about
intuition is that we need to use our fingers to count if needed. But there is nothing in “7+5=12” which
immediately gives us the number 12. Kant’s point is clearer if we try 234+585=819. There is nothing
in the sum that leads us to the answer, 819. We don’t immediately get “819” when we think
“234+585.” Thus, this is a synthetic judgment, that is, it contains information about the world which I
did not already know—such as the case for analytic statements. For a further discussion on this see
Gottfried Martin’s Arithmetic and Combinatorics, Kant and his Contemporaries, Ch. 6, “Synthetic
Judgment in Arithmetic” (discussed below); also see Johann Schulz, Appendix in Arithmetic and
Combinatorics, Kant and his Contemporaries, Schulz gives a detailed formulations of how
mathematical proofs are constructed. He deals with the way in which theorems hold by way of either
using a conceptual axiomatic approach, or Kant’s approach through the forms of intuition. Kripke

12

The main problem Kant sees in all previous philosophy is that mathematic
propositions are thought of as analytic (a priori) while metaphysical propositions are
thought of as synthetic a priori. Thus we see that Hume would not have allowed for
mathematical statements as synthetic a priori (given his skepticism). 29 Finally, Kant
states that metaphysical statements have to be grounded in cognition. The conclusion
from all this is that for any metaphysical statement to be grounded, it has to be an
object of possible experience.30 Kant argues in order to have a ground for a
possibility of grounding metaphysics in possible experience by answering the
following questions:
1)
2)
3)
4)

How is pure mathematics possible?
How is pure natural science possible?
How is metaphysics in general possible?
How is metaphysics as a science possible?31

The answer to these questions makes up the whole of Kant’s argument against the
“old metaphysics.”
The common thread among all these questions is that judgments are to be
grounded in pure intuition.32 One might question (this was certainly Plato’s thesis for

(1972, pp. 274-275) offers a devastating objection to Kant’s distinction between the analytic/synthetic
distinction stating that some a priori judgments are both a priori and contingent. Kripke’s example is
referencing a yard stick in Paris at time0 measuring one meter. A priori, the observer knows that the
measurement is “one meter” long. The observer must fix the reference to this one meter stick. Fixing
the reference makes it a problem of a priori judgments to be conclusive. Resolving this is a topic for
another paper. The idea is that if we take Kant as the point of departure, we are able to see the
minimum requirements for us to think about beliefs and judgments in general.
29

[4:272-273] Kant once again charges Hume for holding this view—Hume rejects mathematics as
synthetic a priori, and as the rest of all other philosophers and mathematicians, holds that all
mathematical propositions are analytic. What Kant’s sees as a grave mistake is to regard metaphysics
as synthetic a priori. That is, metaphysical propositions are true regardless of our cognitions; they give
us new information about the world (and even beyond).
30
Ibid. [4:274], this is also the subject of “How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible?” [4:276-280].
31

Ibid. [4:280]
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arguing against any position that relied on the senses) how it is possible to intuit
anything a priori…Kant’s answer to this is to look at things as a representation as
they appear in their immediacy.33 One might ask, how can the intuition precede the
object itself? The answer arises from a reference to old metaphysics, where any kind
of statement regarding objects of intuition is impossible because these statements
refer to things as they are in themselves. It is only in this way that intuitions (that
lead to representations) would not take place a priori.34 Kant’s formulation of how
we are able to intuit things a priori is as follows:
There is thus only one way in which it is possible for my intuition to precede
the actuality of the object and take place as cognition a priori, namely if it
contains nothing else than the form of sensibility, which in me as subject
precedes al lactual impressions through which I am affected by objects. […]
from it [that objects can be intuited in the form of sensibility] follows: that all
propositions which concern merely this form of sensible intuition will be
possible and valid for objects of the senses; equally the converse, that
intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things other
than objects of our senses.35
The pure intuitions Kant is referring to are space & time (S&T). Adding to the
critique of the old metaphysics, Kant states that prior to him, space & time were
thought of as pure concepts or as “things-in-themselves”. When talking about objects
in the world, such as geometrical figures, Kant states that it should be the case that we
should be able to completely find two exact objects. If it was the case that space &
time were “things-in-themselves” and not pure forms of intuition, we would have no

32

Ibid. [4:281]

33

Ibid. [4:282]

34

Ibid. [4:282-283]

35

Ibid. [4:282-283]
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problem with this task. However, when we see that the reflection of our left hand is
our right hand, there is something awkward about this.36 Kant’s point is that there is
incongruence when we try to combine our left hand to the reflection in the mirror (the
right hand). The reason for this is that things are not appearances of things as they are
in themselves, but forms of sensible intuition.37 Thus, Kant states, we come to our
conclusion about mathematics, specifically, geometry and arithmetic; mathematical
objects are grounded in sensible intuition—they are not appearance of things as they
are “in-themselves”38 One might ask, as Plato did, why we would not want to do this
kind of epistemological “grounding.” Kant’s position could be categorized as a
relativist position, because we could say that our senses or our sensibility39 are too
unstable to be able to guarantee any type of epistemological ground. This seems to be
an easy way out from Kant’s genius, and general insight about the limitations of
philosophy and metaphysics specifically. For Kant, the geometer, as he/she sits in his
desk thinking about geometric figures and propositions can see that lines, for example
are part of sensible experience. They are not merely subjective illusions, but objects
of ordinary experience.40

Kant’s view of Idealism thus:

36

Ibid. [4:286], Kant’s examples also include geometrical figures, but his point is clearer when we use
the hand example. If it is the case that we see things that “participate” in forms, it should be the case
that we find two things that are identical at all times.
37

Ibid. [4:286]

38

Ibid. [4:287]

39

This would certainly be Spinoza’s critique of Kant. For Spinoza, the affects are unreliable, and thus
we must do away from sensibility to make room for Reason.
40

Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, [4:288] Here, once again, Kant states that
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Idealism consists in the assertion that there are none other than thinking
beings; the other things which we believe to perceive in intuition are only
representations in the thinking beings, to which in fact no object outside the
latter corresponds. Say on the contrary: things are given to us as objects of our
senses situated outside us, but of what they may be in themselves we know
nothing; we only know their appearances, i.e. the representations they bring
about in us when they affect our senses.41
Thus it seems that the idealist position has a harder time justifying objects as
appearances of “things-in-themselves.”
Furthermore, geometers, and mathematicians do not merely use the senses to
comet to proof the indubitability of geometric figures, or arithmetical axioms. It is
necessary to use the understanding to come to judgments about the world which
might be true or false.42 Kant is clear that “illusions” can arise whether we conceive
of space & time as sensible intuitions or as “things-in-themselves.” The “illusion”
arises from our carelessness. To this regard Kant makes the following point about
mathematics:
My doctrine of the ideality of space & time, therefore, so far from making the
whole world of the senses into mere illusion, is rather the only means of
securing the application to actual objects of one of the most important
cognitions, namely that which mathematics expounds a priori, and of
preventing it from being held to be mere illusion, because without this
observation it would be quite impossible to decide whether the intuitions of
space & time, which we take from no experience and which yet lie in our
representation a priori, were not chimeras of the brain made by us to which no
object corresponds, at least not adequately, and thus geometry itself a mere
illusion; whereas on the contrary, just because all objects of the world of the
senses are mere appearances, we have been able to show the indisputable
validity of geometry in respect to them.43
ground our concepts except in “spurious metaphysics” where we call for “pure logic” (as a thing-initself).
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Kant’s main argument here is that if we grant that we are speaking about appearances
of “things-in-themselves,” we cannot possibly be sure of the validity of our
statements (since we can never know things as they are in themselves).
The second part of the Prolegomena deals with the question “how is Pure
Natural Science possible?” From the foregoing discussion, we can already see that
Kant has provided the ground for the possibility of natural science. For Kant,
“[n]ature is the existence of things, insofar as the latter is determined according to
universal laws.”44 Once again if by nature, we meant the existence of things-inthemselves, we would never know nature; not a priori—and certainly not a posteriori.
A priori reasoning deals with analysis of concepts (from which we form analytic
judgments). These analytic judgments, as mentioned earlier, are mere tautologies.
We cannot possibly learn anything new by analyzing these types of concepts (about
nature). According to Kant, knowing things a priori necessarily involves our
understanding’s conformity to these laws, not the other way around (that is, we do not
go around just positing laws of nature…). Furthermore, knowledge of nature a
posteriori, or through experience, is impossible because this would indicate that we
could have such cognition about things-in-themselves.45
What then, is the ground for the possibility of science? The key is
mathematics applied to the appearances.46 Kant claim is that this formulation allows
the possibility for objects of inner senses as well as objects of outer senses. How is it
44
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possible to come to such a conclusion? It is because we are concerned with the sum
total of all objects of experience. Thus, cognition about what could not be objects of
experience would be “hyperphysical.” That is this cognition would only hold in
thought, not in application. It is thus, that we are able to come to hold that objects of
experience are a priori possible and precede all experience. 47
After we have this possibility for science, there seems to be a lack of clarity as
to what exactly these objects we have thus mentions are about. In sections §21 &
§21[B]48, Kant provides tables which are subject to the universal conditions of
intuition: Namely, the “Logical table of judgments”, the “transcendental table of
concepts of the understanding,” and the “Pure physiological table of universal
principles of natural science.” These are supposed to be the foundational principles
as the ground for the possibility of knowledge. These tables not only guarantee
knowledge, but they guarantee synthetic judgments a priori. That is, this foundation
Kant has provided is not only knowledge a priori (prior to any experience), but we
can also build upon this knowledge (thus the synthetic element). This is the
cornerstone of a natural science.49
Experience and reason are well connected, according to Kant, but it is not
always the case that reason leads us to judgments about the world which are true.
The third section of the Prolegomena deals with this specific question. How is it that
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The last two questions about the possibility of metaphysics, and metaphysics as a science follows the
same argument Kant has given thus far. In order for us to have any type of knowledge about the world
we must have a ground upon which synthetic a priori knowledge is possible.
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reason can make mistakes, and yet, we are to have an objective system about nature
(and the world) which will hold independently of experience? This question seems to
follow from the two previous questions about mathematics and science. It is not
clear, Kant states, that once we have established the objectivity of mathematics and
natural science, we are better because the objectivity of such things is for its own
sake. The purpose of metaphysics, for Kant, is
namely the occupation of reason merely with itself and the acquaintance with
objects that is supposed to arise immediately from brooding over its own
concepts, without needing the mediation of experience or in any way being
able to reach that acquaintance through experience.50
Mathematics and natural science exist for themselves. Therefore, it is of no use for us
to be able to see that they exist in this independent manner. What is interesting is to
be able to come to know things that are objective, but that depend on the structure of
reason as it exists in humans—that is Kant’s project, to provide “the grounding for a
science which is to contain the system of all these cognitions a priori [ideas which
correspond to objects in the world], that without such a separation metaphysics is
absolutely impossible, and at best random […]”51 In order to see that Kant provides a
ground for the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, we need to go back and see
that if we thought that metaphysics consisted of describing “things-in-themselves,”
we would merely have analytic propositions to ground our knowledge for science (or
any other knowledge for that matter).52 One of Kant’s clearest statements about the
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grounds for the possibility of knowledge was to divide our realm of inquiry into the
realm of understanding (space & time), and the realm of Reason (as a things that
deals with all objects including those that are not inside space & time).53
Kant furthers his explanation in sections §46-§49 of the Prolegomena on the
psychological ideas. Previous to Kant, there was a confusion of the formulation “S is
P.” Descartes for example, as already mentioned, could only hold the validity of the
“S;” and while others could not even do this (Hume),54 Kant’s formulation of ideas is
allows for the formulation “S is P” to hold a priori. This is not merely by assuming
away the validity of S, or P, but through stating that our knowledge depends on the
agreement between ideas (in the understanding and in Pure Reason), and things in
nature.55
The last part of Kant’s Prolegomena deals with the questions about the
possibility of metaphysics in general and metaphysics as a science. The answer to
these questions should be clear at this point. It is only possible to know objects of
possible experience. Any formulation that deals with objects outside the realm of

this could be a criticism of Kant, but it is not necessarily clear that Kant disagrees with this—even in
Kant’s formulation of the grounds for a science, we are clearly in a position to make errors, and Kant
does state this about the understanding [that is, reason restricted to space & time]. The way for us to
disentangle mistakes of the understanding from knowledge of things as they appear to us is to have
already established an ontology of objects of possible experience. This way, we are able to rely on
fundamental principles (i.e. the principle of contradiction) as the ground for the possibility making
objective epistemic claims.
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experience will deal with objects about which we can only speculate, but cannot
know.56

56

See sections §50-§56; section §56 deals with the Theological Idea in which Kant makes this point
starkly. It should be highly stressed that the first two antimonies presented about space & time; and
about the world make the whole of Kant’s view on epistemology even clearer. The first antimony
states that either: (thesis) space & time have a beginning, or (antithesis) space & time are infinite. In
the first case, we are dealing with Kant’s realm of the space & time as boundaries for experience; in
the latter case, we are dealing with things-in-themselves (because it is not possible to have the infinite
as an object of possible experience). Some versions of Platonism respond to Kant by showing that
objects outside space and time are knowable (e.g. Full-Blooded-Platonism).
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3. Ontology of Mathematics
Kant’s conception of mathematics as the ground of knowledge cannot be
overlooked when talking about mathematics. Kant argues that mathematics is
constructed due to the capacity for experience with which we are equipped. For Kant,
mathematics is the truest case of synthetic judgments a priori par excellence.
Ontology of mathematics refers to what type of entities mathematics things are. For
Kant, objects in nature are part of how humans are and how the world is. The
Kantian/Newtonian model gives us a view of the world in which there is integration
between the “pure forms of intuition” (space & time) and the physical world. The
way we conceive of mathematical objects and mathematical structures affects our
understanding of these objects. Kant’s argument for the “construction” of
mathematical objects within space and time, for him, assures that we have epistemic
access for mathematical objects. The competing camp in the ontology of
mathematics against “constructing” our knowledge of mathematical structures and
objects goes back to Platonic Idealism. This section presents different ways that the
mathematics can be conceived, furthering and challenging Kant’s vision for the
structure of knowledge and mathematics lying at the foundation of knowledge.
3.1 Gottfried Martin, Kant’s Ontology of Mathematics57
Gottfried Martin’s Arithmetic and Combinatorics, Kant and his
Contemporaries gives a detailed account of the history of mathematics and its attempt
to ground mathematics as a pure science. It seems that all mathematicians follow a
platonic line of thought to ground mathematics. It is only through Johann Schulz that
57
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we have a correct interpretation of Kant’s philosophical insight about knowledge and
its dependence on the forms of intuition.
This question is dealt with in “The Axiomatics and Logic of Mathematics.”
The main problem (already raised in the Prolegomena) seems to be that the
axiomatization of mathematics is a conceptual/analytic form of grounding. Our
epistemology depends on assumptions about concepts, from which we can derive our
proofs.58 Martin cites five different ways in which mathematics can be derived
(starting with axioms):
1) Arithmetic and geometry depend on axioms and are constructive in
structure. Kant
2) Arithmetic and geometry depend on axioms but are deductive in structure
Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843), Husserl, Hilbert, Peano, Zermelo,
Johann Friedrich König (1798-1865)
3) Arithmetic and geometry can be deduced purely logically, both principles
and the theorems. Leibniz, Wolff, Hermann Günter Grassmann (18091877), Russell, [Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Wittgenstein
4) Arithmetic is logically deductive, geometry is axiomatically constructive.
Practically all the great mathematicians of the nineteenth century followed
Gauss in making such a distinction between arithmetic and geometry […]
5) Arithmetic is logically deductive, geometry axiomatically deductive.
Frege, Vloemans.59

What is important to notice here is that there is a disagreement about the way in
which our grounding of mathematics should take place. Virtually all 2-5 go against
Kant’s view. Martin’s states that we could easily classify all these formulations in
Kantian terms of analytic and synthetic. Any logistic or axiomatic formulation will
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fall under analytic statements.60 Any constructive or deductive formulation will fall
under synthetic propositions.61 Martin points out that Kant is not well known for his
thinking about mathematics, but we see that Kant has great insight not only for the
axiomatization of mathematics but also philosophy in general.
Kant’s The Concept of Negative Quantities (1763) shows the relation between
numbers of opposition. It is not that a “negative quantity” exists.62 With respect to
mathematicians, Kant states:
The concept of negative quantities has long been used in mathematics and it is
also of the greatest importance there. Nevertheless, the ideal which most have
gotten of it and the explanation they have given is astonishing and
contradictory, although no inaccuracy has arisen in application, for the
particular rules replaced the definition and guaranteed the use; but what may
have been mistaken in the judgment about the nature of the abstract concept
has remained useless and has been without consequence63
Thus, even though mathematics is derived through methods 2-5 (see above), we still
see a great deal of misinterpretation about the status of negative numbers.64 Kant
clearly states that negative numbers are merely the opposition in quantity. The
clearest example is in wealth and debts, regarding which, the relation ship is one of
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“canceling out.” The interpretation that negative numbers are entities on their own
comes from the lack of consideration of the transcendentality of numbers.65
“Combinatorics and the Idea of a Systematic Ontology” discusses the way in
which we are to build an ontology through which we can describe the world as it
appears to us. The main works in the history of mathematics where we find an
attempt to derive an ontology of mathematics is Leibniz’s De arte Combinatoria.
This work presents the way in which our knowledge is made up of elementary
concepts and complex concepts.66 These concepts form knowledge through a system
of signs (that is of the form “S is P”). Martin clearly points out that Leibniz’s system
depends on the existence of elementary concepts. Furthermore, it is not clear that
Leibniz thinks that there are synthetic propositions (where the S is already contained
in the P—i.e. the sum of the interior angles of any triangle sum to 180˚).67 Recall
Kant’s rigorous derivation of what a science should be. The foundation of any
science is made up of analytic and synthetic propositions; these propositions make up
knowledge. There are stark differences between Kant and Leibniz though: with
regards to the distinction of appearances of things in space & time and “things-in-
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includes π and e) and imaginary, or complex numbers (√-1). Mathematicians simply ignore what this
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themselves,” Leibniz makes reference to “things-in-themselves,” whereas Kant
clearly thinks this is impossible to do.68
Thus we come to Kant’s assertion that any ontology, if it is to have any solid
grounding upon which we can make epistemic claims, must be derived from
fundamental axioms, which stand on their own, but connect the human mind to the
outer world of experience. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant states:
Pure synthesis, thought of generally, gives us the pure concept of the intellect.
By this synthesis, however, I mean that which depends on a base of synthetic
unity a priori. Thus our counting (above all seen in the larger numbers) is a
synthesis according to concepts, because it is done according to a common
base of unity (e.g., the decimal)69
Thus, synthetic judgments in arithmetic (and in general) depend on an “Allness”
which provides the unity of concepts upon which knowledge stands.70 This “Allness”
can be described as Kant’s “Schematism of the pure concepts of understanding.” The
schematism connects apperception to pure concepts. That is, to synthetic
propositions a priori, in this case, arithmetic propositions.71 Gottfried Martin notes
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Kant’s obscurity72 in trying to work out the exactness of schematism with regards to
mathematics, specifically, to numbers. Martin’s states that we must think of the
concept of number as “inseparable from the perception of time.”73 Thus, the
schematism allows the senses to be connected to the outer appearances in unity. It is
ultimately this unity which allows us to have synthetic judgments a priori (in
particular those of arithmetic74 and geometry75).
3.2 From Kant to Contemporary Views on the Ontology of Mathematics
This section deals with current views in the philosophy of mathematics. We
draw extensively from Balaguer (1998) who states that there are two equally
defensible philosophies of mathematics. These philosophies of mathematics are

world (That is why we are able to have an objective reality that is stable, without having to fall under a
Humean, or Berkeleyan trap).
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essential to economics to serve as foundations for what is and what is not plausible in
economic theory.
3.2a Mathematical Platonism
We have seen that in Kant’s formulation of science depends on the senses as a
vehicle for understanding. Mathematics, for Kant, allows us to “know” things
independently of our ability to grasp what is at hand—but Kant’s analysis can only
take us so far. Kant’s “refutation” of idealism is not a refutation of Platonism
altogether. Furthermore, our analysis of the interrelation between natural science and
mathematics has only been carried in terms of geometry and arithmetic. Although,
for the purposes of epistemology this is fine, we need to further analyze the
consequences for the ontology of mathematics of the later developments in
mathematics—namely set theory. Mark Balaguer’s Platonism & anti-Platonism in
Mathematics gives us a nice way to bring both Kantian and Platonic adherents in the
philosophy of mathematics under an equally defensible ontology76 (and
epistemology) of mathematics. Balaguer states that there is a “fictionalist” account of
mathematics which holds that statements like “3 is a prime number” is a fictional
statement—the entity of the number 3 need no necessarily exist. The Platonist variant
of this is that the number 3 does in fact exist. Balaguer’s analysis allows us to view
two ways in which a mathematical ontology (the nature of mathematical “entities”)
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the only defensible views—and ultimately what he calls “isomorphic” (or equivalent).

28

and a mathematical epistemology (the acquisition of knowledge of these entities) can
be carried out in a non-question-begging manner.77
The first half of Platonism & anti-Platonism in Mathematics deals with
defending Full-Blooded-Platonism (FBP). FBP is the theory that mathematical
objects exist only insofar as they are logically possible.78 For this task, Balaguer has
to answer to typical objections to Platonism in Mathematics (as mathematical
objects). The main argument against Platonism is the epistemological argument
which states that:
1) Human beings exist entirely within space-time.
2) If there exist any abstract mathematical objects, then they exist outside of
space and time
Therefore by CTK [Causal Theory of Knowledge]79,
3) If there exist any abstract mathematical objects, then human beings could
not have knowledge of them.
Therefore,
4) If mathematical Platonism is correct, then human beings could not attain
mathematical knowledge.
5) Human beings have mathematical knowledge.
Therefore,
6) Mathematical Platonism is not correct.80
Balaguer proceeds to give a taxonomy of strategies to call into question the validity of
the epistemic argument against Platonism. Ultimately, what Balaguer want to do is
defeat all versions of Platonism except the FBP version. The first strategy is to call
into question the validity of the CTK. It is not clear that the transition from (2) to (3)
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follows smoothly. One possible view is that we can attain some knowledge of these
non-spatiotemporal objects via mathematical intuition. The question now becomes
how this is possible. We have to argue for the immateriality of the mind. This view,
however, is unintelligible, because the “transfer” of knowledge takes place between
non-spatiotemporal objects (which are causally inert) and the minds in space and
time. What this amounts to is focusing on the immateriality of the mind—as separate
from the brain, which could allow for a type of cross-realm communication. This is a
simple argument to block (1) but of course not enough. What ultimately needs to be
developed from this is an ontological thesis which states that there exist real mental
states which are irreducible to merely physical states.81 If it is the case that the mind
is spatiotemporal, Balaguer argues, statements and thoughts are not only reducible to
physical states, but to Turing Machines—that is causally connected statements by
reductive algorithms. If our minds are physical, then we can reduce minds to
machines. It is arguably the case that our minds are irreducible to machines (for this
has consequences in all realms of philosophy and other sciences). Balaguer here is
presenting Kurt Gödel’s view on what mathematical objects might be, and how it is
possible to have cross-realm contact with such objects.
Gödel’s view was that the purpose of the mind is through intuition to come to
know what “reality” was like in forming thoughts, through the senses, about the
appearances of reality. Thus, for Gödel, it seems that reality is connected through the
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spatiotemporal “reality” in some way.82 We have called into question (1) but we
must move onto the rest of the argument.
The next move for Balaguer is to try to reject (2). Although this takes quite a
bit of effort, we shall only provide the mode of (“naturalistic”) Platonism represented
by Penelope Maddy. This view states that it is possible to have knowledge of abstract
objects through sense perception.83 Maddy’s view amounts to correlating sense
perception with the notion of sets.84 Balaguer has a discussion about the way in
which sets are defined in the philosophy of mathematics—one can define sets in the
traditional abstract sense where one can state the categorical relationship among
objects inside a set. The second definition of a set deals with a “naturalized” variant
which deals with defining sets in terms of physical objects (further divided into
singular and aggregate). Thus the set of 1 egg, or many eggs represents a singular set,
and the latter an aggregate (indefinite) set. For the purposes of this paper, Balaguer
concludes that it is not possible to correlate singular sets or aggregate sets to mental
states (which make reference to the way in which we perceive each set differently).
For Maddy, it seems that she wants to overcome the epistemic problem of knowledge
by asserting a perceptual mechanism by which we are able to come in contact with
mathematical objects (namely sets). The problem raised by Balaguer is the way in

82

Ibid. pg. 28

83

Ibid. pg. 28

84
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which we divide the singular set from the aggregate set is problematic when we start
talking about mental states (and mental stuff in general).85 We have failed to reject
(2) at this point, Balaguer calls on other forms of Platonism to try to do this.
The whole of these other arguments, as Balaguer suggests, are different ways
to say that there can be knowledge without contact. The first is a truly innocuous
position which states that we do not need an explanation for how we can acquire
knowledge of non-spatiotemporal objects. This view of course tries to avoid the
problem by not addressing it.86
The No-Contact Theory of Intuition (NCTI) which states that we can get
knowledge of mathematical objects via “intuition.”87 This is an internal view that is
problematic because it “merely restates the problem.”88
Next on the list we have holism and empirical confirmation of Willard Quine
among others. Quine’s view states that we have good reason to believe our
mathematical theories are true because they are central to our worldview. This
includes having those mathematical theories being confirmed empirically (by using
them in our scientific theories). Balaguer clearly states that the problem with
confirmation holism is that it is outright false. Empirical findings do not prove
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apparatus (beyond one person) to be able to come to knowledge which is in space and time. The
notion here is slightly different, not worked out much more than to refer to a cognitive apparatus—but,
the sense in which NCTI Platonists use this term leaves a gap between the abstracts objects and the
“apparatus.” This is exactly the problem that Kant foresees in the Critique of Pure Reason, although
there is obviously debate as to how well Kant formulates his “solution.”
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theories. With respect to our worldview, confirmation holism does not speak to the
“nominalistic content” of our scientific theories. “Nominalistic content” refers to the
use of non-mathematical language in order to express the theory at hand—even if the
ontology is deemed “fictional” (mathematical objects are constructed). Balaguer cites
the “nominalization of quantum mechanics” as and example of this way of a
“nominalization” which challenges that mathematics behind quantum mechanics can
be expressed simply by logical relations. Balaguer’s point is that the use of highly
technical mathematical language in quantum mechanics does not prove that the
mathematical theories behind the mathematical language are true. The question here
is the expression of the theory in terms of language; the ‘truth’ of the theory clearly
does not depend on the method used (as in FBP).89
The “necessity” view bears similar problems to the conformational view. The
necessity view states that we can acquire knowledge about mathematical objects
through our senses, and this knowledge is necessarily true. Taking the example of
adding two numbers in arithmetic we can construct an entire “knowledge” of numbers
according to this necessity view. It seems that this view is an attempt at restating
(although badly) what Kant points to, and Gottfried Martin further develops. The
only necessity in connection to arithmetic is dealing with what Kant called analytic
statements (from which we cannot learn anything). Analytic statements must hold
independent of how we construct our theory of arithmetic. Balaguer’s objection is
very much Kant’s, we cannot have knowledge of things merely by positing a
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Ibid. pp. 40-41 more on the nominalization view with respect to “fictionalism.”
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definition and deriving a system of “logic” from these definitions (this amounts to a
tautological account of mathematics).90
All these versions of Platonism are what Balaguer calls non-plenitudinous
forms of Platonism (that is, these forms of Platonism want to commit to some forms
of mathematical objects and not others) which fail to satisfy all the epistemic
challenges posed mainly by Paul Benacerraf which deal with the objection against
Platonists that knowledge of mathematical objects is not possible without contact.
This attack does defeat the various versions of Platonism that we have been briefly
talking about. The next step in the argument is to defend FBP against the
Benacerrafian epistemic challenge.
As defined above, Full-Blooded Platonism commits itself to the existence not
only of mathematical objects, but all objects which are logically possible. In order to
get epistemic access to this non-spatiotemporal realm, Balaguer claims that all we
need to do is acquire knowledge of a purely mathematical theory which is consistent,
acquiring knowledge of this theory is acquiring knowledge of the mathematical
realm. This is a seemingly simple response to the Benacerrafian challenge. If we
ponder about Nepalese villages that exist, we can say that there exist Nepalese
villages. Now, if we can take all possible Nepalese villages that could exist, Balaguer
points out that one cannot have knowledge of these villages, but they do exist.
“Dreaming up” the Nepalese villages might be another objection that can be raised to
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Ibid. pg. 42, Balaguer comments that the “necessity” based view is an uninteresting view which
deals with the knowledge problem trivially—that is by stating certain axioms which might or might not
help the building of knowledge. Kant clearly deals with this problem by separating the types of
propositions that are made (synthetic a priori, analytic a priori, and synthetic a posteriori). See note 74
above for a concise refutation of such a view.
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the FBPist. According to Balaguer, the FBPists simply can respond by asserting that
this “dreaming up” because of FBP, all possible Nepalese villages do exist. That is,
the FBPist commits to the existence of all possible Nepalese villages—this is the
position by FBPists—every Nepalese village that has the logical possibly of
existence, actually exists. We saw earlier the other forms of Platonism cannot make
this claim (i.e. naturalistic forms of Platonism can only claim certain types of objects
but not other types). Thus, a similar move can be done for mathematical objects. The
next set of objections comes obviously from the fact that we can “dream up”
anything; what about beliefs and reference, it clearly is the case that we can’t just
“dream up” any old story. To block this worry, we need to do more work on FBP.
The “logically possible and consistent” assertion by FBPists has to be worked
out more in detail in order to be able to claim a defensible stance. Balaguer points out
the two different ways in which statements can be ‘about’ something. These
statements ‘about’ something can be “metaphysically thick” or “metaphysically thin.”
“Metaphysically thick” statements are ‘about’ something in which the subject has to
be “connected” to the object “in an appropriate way.”91 What this amounts to is that
the statement has to be mapped in the space/time grid. Furthermore, there are
“metaphysically thin” statements ‘about’ something. These statements deal with
subjects and objects which need not be necessarily real—Balaguer’s example is a
little girl’s statement that “Santa Claus is fat.” This is a consistent, coherent,
statement which does not violate any ‘logic;’ but the fact that this statement is a
“metaphysically thin” statement, is of value for the FBPists—reference about
91

Ibid. pg. 49
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mathematical objects (and others as well) need not be “metaphysically thick.” In fact,
reference to mathematical object can be used in the “metaphysically thin” sense to
ease some worries about the “dreaming up” of objects in general. If we are to defend
FBP, Balaguer states, it has to come about through this route. Through
metaphysically thin statements, Balaguer, states, we are able to come to defend FBP.
The full argument for FBP is given as follows:
(i) FBP-ists can account for the fact that human beings can—without coming
into contact with the mathematical realm—formulate purely mathematical
theories
(ii) FBP-ists can account for the fact that human beings can—without coming
into contact with the mathematical realm—know of many of these purely
mathematical theories that they are consistent
(iii) If (ii) is true, then FBP-ists can account for the fact that (as a general rule)
if mathematicians accept a purely mathematical theory T, then T is consistent
Therefore,
(iv) FBP-ists can account for the fact that (as a general rule) if mathematicians
accept a purely mathematical theory T, then T is consistent.
(v) If FBP is true, then every consistent purely mathematical theory truly
describes the mathematical realm, that is, truly describes some collection of
mathematical objects
Therefore,
(vi) FBP-ists can account for the fact that (as a general rule) if mathematicians
accept a purely mathematical theory T, then T truly describes part of the
mathematical realm.92

The fact that mathematicians believe a theory does not mean that the theory will be
consistent, and the fact that a theory is consistent is not enough to believe it. The
argument given here for FBP is to show that as a theory of mathematical objects, FBP
can account for things that other versions of Platonism are not able to account for. In
order to defend FBP we need to look at the main objections leveled against FBP.
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Ibid. pp. 51-52, the proof for (i) is given in the last few pages (31-33), if (ii) and (iii) are true, the rest
of the argument follows. Thus, we need to fully defend FBP against possible objections.
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The first thing to note about FBP is how it serves as a metaphysical
foundation to mathematical theories. One of the main set theories in mathematics is
that developed by Zermelo and Fraenkel (denoted ZF set-theory)93. Balaguer states
that FBP services ZF set-theory much better than other forms of Platonism. Balaguer
cites two types of ZF Set-Theory, one where the continuum hypothesis94 is true (ZF +
CH) and one where the continuum hypothesis is false (ZF – CH). Other forms of
Platonism are limited in talking about the mathematical realm based on how those
forms of Platonism are formulated (naturalistic Platonism is restricted to what we can
say about the natural world). Since both set theories are consistent (that is, whether
we take the continuum hypothesis to be true or false) we have two distinct theories
which describe different universes of sets. FBP is able to account for this, whereas
other forms of Platonism scramble to reformulate their commitments.95
The next worry is to about the term “consistency.” We define consistency as
relating to a theory that is logically possible and non-contradictory in its description
of the mathematical realm. Thus, there is a worry that FBP entails a shift in the term
“consistent” to mean “true” tautologically. That is, FBP commits itself to a theory
that is true, immediately after it is deemed consistent. The response to this worry
deals with providing an explanation on how we are able to restrict our domain of our
mathematical theory to truly describe the mathematical realm. This is done by seeing
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ZF set theory is a mathematical theory about universes of sets founded on axioms. Set theory is the
foundation of how calculus is possible (among other forms of mathematics).
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The continuum hypothesis states that there is an unlimited continuum of universes, thus, there exists
an infinite number of spaces that lie side by side.
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how mathematical theories are grounded (in natural numbers, for example). By
seeing how mathematical theories are grounded in a natural way, we can then give a
more comprehensive definition of consistency. Consistency is that which is logically
possible and also partially grounded in a natural way.96 This type of consistency
allows us to posit type-token relationships metaphysically in mathematics (although
this also extends to other areas of study where metaphysics is called for). FBP allows
for multiple responses to “open questions.”97 FBP allows multiple isomorphic98
(equivalent) theories. This, of course is subject to rigorous research and discovery.99
If FBP does so well being the house of multiple equivalent theories, there
might be a problem establishing how to weed out the “bad” theories from the good
ones. Balaguer here refers us to the use of “standard models” of mathematics. These
standard models are axiomatically grounded models that have been developed based
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Ibid. pg. 61, Balaguer speaks of a Language L which is grounded in a natural way that relates to
mathematical theories that actually describe the mathematical realm. What should be noted here is that
FBP covers more mathematical ground than other forms of Platonism. Furthermore, FBP can better
account for distinctions between actual and fictional statements which are logically consistent. Other
forms of Platonism are not able to do this because they are foundationally committed—thus, the only
way to incorporate a logical fictional account (a novel) vs. an actual logical account (set theory) is to
keep referring to the axioms of logic upon which each of these areas is founded.
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Ibid. pg. 62, Open questions are items in the philosophy of mathematics for which no singular truth
can be ascribed. The example here is once again ZF set theory where the continuum hypothesis is true
or false. Balaguer states that traditional Platonist accounts of mathematics “dictate” open questions
(pg. 63).
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In the case that mathematical theories are not equivalent, we might have to do more work to
determine if those theories describe different parts of the mathematical realm (as in ZF+CH and ZFCH).
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A more detailed discussion of “consistency” in general, with links between logic and mathematics is
given in Ibid. pp. 69-75. Balaguer describes the foundation of mathematics as relying in intuitive, noncontradictory logical observations on which the more complex mathematical statements are formed. A
theory is “consistent if it is semantically and syntactically consistent.” That is, if our notion of
consistency is intuitively valid (we have good reasons to rule out skeptical arguments), then we have a
possibility to develop a sound mathematical theory.
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on our limited contact with the mathematical realm. This limited contact with the
mathematical realm, Balaguer states, is enough ground mathematical theories. Thus,
the research that mathematicians do requires them to build upon existing “standard
models.” This “building upon” allows mathematicians to extend other theories by
extending “standard models” or by building new models based on “our intuitions,
notions and conceptions.”100
If we rely on our intuitions, notions and conceptions, one might say, as
Balaguer states, that “there is no number 7.” According to FBP, this is truly describes
the mathematical realm. The question arises when we speak of the entire
mathematical realm. A sentence like “there is no number 7” could amount to a
mathematical theory with a whole in the sequence of natural numbers which is part of
the mathematical realm, but it could not amount to a theory about the entire
mathematical realm, since it is contradictory with our current notion of mathematics,
and in particular, natural numbers.101 Thus, FBP is truly committed to logical
statements which truly describe the mathematical realm. Statements like “there is no
number seven” might sound challenging to FBP but they are not interesting
metaphysically.102
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Ibid. pg. 67, one can object that since we are dependent on the notion of our current mathematical
theories “being right” we might never be able to counter such sentences. Thanks to Professor Urquhart
for this observation.
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Another interpretations of this sentence might be non-cognitivism about the whole of
mathematics—in which case all theories are in the same position of indeterminacy with respect to
being able to build upon axioms which depend on our notions of mathematics.
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Another objection similar to the last one is to say that FBPists concede that
sentences like “there is no number 7 and “2+2=5” truly describe part of the
mathematical realm, yet, these sentences seem plain false. We notice that the
objection is trying to attack FBPists inability to distinguish between theories. The
problem here, Balaguer, states, is that, there might be a way to formulate a model in a
“non-standard” way where these sentences truly describe part of the mathematical
realm. But, when we use these sentences based on our current standard mathematical
theories, these statements are false (in some absolute sense, and FBP is able to
account for this by allowing the possibility to expand on open questions in
mathematics). Balaguer states that we might be able to formulate a theorem where
“2+2=5” or that ‘5’ is equivalent to our current usage of ‘4.’ This might be a
confusing way to proceed with any argument to try to build a new mathematical
theory.103
The last important objection to FBP is to say that FBP does not account for
the uniqueness of mathematical theories. The non-uniqueness objection states that
since we don’t have unique definitions of numbers, we cannot possibly come to any
conclusive description of the mathematical realm.104 Since there is a contradiction in
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Ibid. pg. 67; pg. 53 provides a brief explanation on the relationship between mathematics and
physics. This relationship allows us to have “internalist” and “externalist” versions of mathematics.
Thus, one way to counter the current objection is to say that our current use of mathematical language
is also grounded on our observation of the physical world—the next step of the refutation would be to
provide compelling reasons why we think mathematics truly describes the physical world. This would
not be hard to do (e.g. Newtonian mechanics).
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See Benacerraff’s “What numbers Could not be” in Philosophy of Mathematics, Selected Readings.
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these this instance, FBP must be false. This is called the uniqueness objection to
FBP.105
In “What Numbers Could not be,” Benacerraf deals with the non-uniqueness
of mathematical theories which states that mathematical theories cannot be reduced to
a unique theory. That is, if it is the case that there are mathematical objects, and we
are able to access the mathematical realm, why is it that mathematical objects can be
described in the same manner? To make this objection clearer, let’s look back at
Kant’s example of “7+5.” This objection deals with breaking down the 7 and the 5
into their respective sub-components—that is stating 7 as “1+1+1+1+1+1+1” and 5 as
“1+1+1+1+1.” Another way to break down either 7 or 5 is into other sums. Thus, 5
can be expressed as “3+2” or “4+1” or “3+1+1” or “2+1+1+1” etc.106 Thus, there is
nothing in “7+5” that immediately leads to “12.” The problem here is epistemic.
According to Benacerraf, there is no way to come to any conclusive statement about
the mathematical realm because of this problematic. The conclusion drawn by
Benacerraf is a form of mathematical fictionalism (to be defended below) where our
mathematical theories are “fictions,” but these “fictions” truly describe the
mathematical realm. Balaguer’s response to the non-uniqueness objection to FBP is
to assert that non-uniqueness is not really a threat to FBP. Looking at our Full
Conception of Natural Numbers (FCNN), Balaguer states that the problem of
uniqueness disappears when we look at our mathematical theories from a structural
stance. Viewing our mathematical theory structurally, uniqueness is overshadowed.
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See Mark Balaguer, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Ch. 4.

106

The set-theoretical formulation of the objection is given in Benacerraff (1983 [1965]).
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This is not merely a shift of focus. If it was the case that a theory needs to have a
unique reference for every object, then theories in other areas might be threatened.107
Structuralism allows us to discern the main patterns at work in our mathematical
theories. When talking about abstract objects, Balaguer observes an intimate
connection between numbers in general, abstract objects, reference and language. It
is not the case that we make reference to a chair in a singular way. The chair might
have accidental properties which affect the way in which the chair is presented in the
mind—there is not one unique way to conceive a chair. FBP can embrace this simply
by seeing that this non-uniqueness truly describes the way we experience the world
and reference concrete and abstract objects.108 In the case of abstract objects, such as
numbers, we can see that the number “7” for example, if referred to as “5+2” or any
other combination instead of “7” can lead to skepticism. There might be an endless
questioning of what “7” really means. In order to deflect skeptical arguments against
our conception of numbers, Balaguer makes reference to our “full conception of
natural numbers.” This conception of natural numbers grounds our ability to come to
knowledge, at least of numbers.
Thus far we have considered some of the main worries that we might have in
holding the FBP view. Given the various objections to FBP, according to Balaguer,
FBP is able to answer these objections and is the best version of Platonism. The main
worry against Platonism, according to Balaguer, is that Platonism does not survive the
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Metaethics, consumer theory, and action theory come to mind.
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Ibid. pp. 80-87, this conception of abstract objects (non-uniqueness of reference) allows us to
account for complexities that might not be obvious in the world.
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epistemic objections brought against it. But, as we saw, knowledge without contact is
possible as long as the knowledge to which we make reference is “consistent.” Other
versions of Platonism do not survive the epistemic challenge because the do not
commit themselves to all logically possible objects. The next section deals with
fictionalism. Fictionalism will have to answer to the questioning of FBP, and if it
succeeds, we will have two defensible metaphysical views on the philosophy of
mathematics.
3.2b Mathematical Fictionalist (Anti-Platonism)
Fictionalism is a form of anti-realism. That is, it states that all mathematical
objects that are referred to in our mathematical theories are “fictions.” Furthermore,
there is no really a “number 3.” When we speak of the “number 3” we use this term
only as a manner of speaking. The term “number 3” is a vacuous term. When we use
it, it is simply used at face value.109 Thus, fictionalism states that there aren’t any
mathematical objects, and the terms like “3” are vacuous terms.110 Fictionalism states
that statements like “3 is a prime number” can be accounted for in the ‘story of
mathematics’ only. Like FBP, fictionalism relies on the development of mathematics
to provide it with a framework in which the “fictions” hold. Like FBP, Fictionalists
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Fictionalism, like Full-Blooded-Platonism is the best version of anti-realist Anti-Platonism. Other
forms of Anti-Platonism include ‘psychologism’ which states that mathematical objects are mental
objects only (ideas); conventionalism which states that mathematical truth are true by convention, and
mathematical If-then-ism which states that mathematical truths require axioms from which all
mathematical truths are derived (from necessity of If-then statements). The objection to all these
theories is that they are only internally consistent. When reference is sought to justify statements
externally, these theories break down (ibid. pp. 11-12). These versions anti-realist anti-Platonism are
rejected because they are based on controversial claims about the ontology of mathematical objects,
unlike fictionalism, which takes the meaning of mathematical objects at “face value” (pg. 102).
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must account for all the metaphysical worries about epistemology, and ontology of
mathematics.
The main difference between anti-realists and realists (Platonists) is that antirealists agree that ‘facts’ about mathematical objects are “true” by invention—that is
mathematicians are free to “construct” theories within certain limitations; Platonists
agree that ‘facts’ about mathematical objects are true in some non-vacuous way, and
those ‘facts’ are discovered.
Our next task is to see why fictionalism is the best version of Anti-Platonism.
One of the main views in philosophy of mind is referred to as psychologism, where
mental objects (ideas) are true as they are constructed by us. These objects are mind
dependent, so, if we all died, sentences like “2+2=4” would cease to exist (and
become false) due to our deaths.111 This is the main problem with psychologism,
because statements like “2+2=4” are mind dependent, we are only able to construct
truth. This is problematic if we want truth statements to be objective, independent of
ideas created in the mind.
Another important view in the philosophy of mathematics that needs to be
considered is realistic Anti-Platonism. This type of Anti-Platonism is different than
other forms like psychologism, and conventionalism in that these other theories are
anti-realist. According to Balaguer, realist anti-Platonism is famously attributed to
John Stuart Mill. This view states that mathematics is the most general of the natural
sciences. The truth of statements like “2+2=4” is accounted by us observing physical
objects and intuitively seeing how when objects are lumped together, this gives us an
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aggregate of objects—the ontology of mathematics under this view is strictly tied to
physical objects. Thus, 2 eggs, coupled with another 2 eggs, would give us 4 eggs.
This type of Realist anti-Platonism ties the truths of mathematics to physical objects.
One of the main and fatal objections to this theory is its inability to account for
different configurations of sets. Thus, this theory lacks the ability to account for the
“stuffness” of objects. Adding eggs to chairs is the exact same thing as adding eggs
to eggs. Thus, egg-stuff is commensurate with chair-stuff. According to Balaguer,
hierarchical mathematical theories like ZF set-theory are able to account for these
differences, simply unavailable to John Stuart Mill’s form of realism.112
Truth’s like “2+2=4” according to Mill are arrived by our study of physical
objects. When we consider such sentences, it is objectionable that these sentences
depend in any way to the relation of physical objects. For Mill, it is possible to derive
an entire system of axioms just from observing physical objects. This is a bit of a
stretch, because it requires the falsification of mathematical facts like “2+2=4” as a
form of an empirical science. That is, facts like “2+2=4” would depend on our
observation, and empirical methods (however sophisticated or antiquated they might
be). Mill’s project concerns itself about physical objects in the world, leaving the
“metaphysical objects” out. Thus Mill thinks that we can arrive at a full description
of the mathematical realm strictly from the physical world. This places enormous
pressure on empirical methods, their predictions, and how that affects the “truth” of
scientific theories. According to Mill, we are able come to truths based solely on our
observation, and modeling of the physical world. In the case of simply accounting for
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physical objects, Mill’s project breaks down when dealing with large quantities (or
extremely small ones as it is the case of quantum physics). If we take the statement
that “2+2=4,” we can derive the “truthness” of the statement by observing objects that
indeed adding 2+2 we get 4. When dealing with large quantities, we have a harder
time gathering the objects, counting, and deriving the truth of the outcome. For Mill,
mathematics is a strictly empirical science.
Given all the problems that we have encountered, fictionalism can account for
these because all that is said about our mathematical theories is not true. All other
theories, not only state that our mathematical theories are true, but these “truths”
depend on mind (psychologism) or on physical objects (Mill’s scientific realism).
If we accept that fictionalism is the best form of anti-realist anti-platonism,
our next worry is whether fictionalism can answer to the Frege’s indispensability
argument.113 Thus, fictionalism would be false if it is not able to account for how our
mathematical theories are indispensable to empirical science.
The main argument against fictionalism is Gottob Frege’s indispensability
argument which states that:
(i) the only way to account for the truth of our mathematical theories is to
adopt Platonism
(ii) The only way to account for the fact that our mathematical theories are
applicable is and/or indispensable to empirical science is to admit that these
theories are true
Therefore,
(iii) Platonism is true and anti-Platonism is false.114
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Frege’s indispensability argument states that mathematical theories are true because they are
indispensable to our empirical theories.
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Ibid. pg. 95 Balaguer’s move is to proceed to attack (ii) by showing that mathematics is not
indispensable to empirical science; furthermore, the fact that mathematics is applicable in an
‘indispensable’ way can be accounted for without abandoning fictionalism (ibid pg. 96); Colyvan
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It seems that Frege’s argument relies heavily on (ii) to try to refute all versions of
anti-Platonism. Balaguer shows that (ii) is false by stating that fictionalists can
account for the ‘indispensability’ of mathematical theories in a similar manner to the
FBPist. The fictionalist can state that the ‘truth’ of our mathematical theories, in
sentences like “2+2=4” is part of the standard story of mathematics whereas other
sentences, like “2+2=5” are not part of the standard story of mathematics.115 There is
another problem that arises for Platonists, as well for fictionalists. Platonists are in
trouble because they are unable to point to the relevant applications of mathematics to
empirical science. Balaguer’s example is that if mathematics provides us information
about Mars and Charles Manson, it doesn’t provide us with what information is
relevant about that particular relationship. Platonists can account for relevant
applications of mathematics to empirical sciences by using a representational account
of mathematics in empirical science. For, example, the way in which we use
temperature depends on the real number line. The relations between numbers
(degrees) are the same as the relations between numbers in arithmetic.116 This is
called a “representational account” of mathematics. Now, although this is a simple
example, we can talk about other examples in physics, chemistry, and biology. The
problem for Platonists is that this “representational account” will not account for all
the applications in the empirical sciences. Fictionalists are able to do the same
(2001) presents a more detailed argument for the indispensability of mathematics, but comes to the
same conclusion.
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because they are able to call on a “representation” to refer to the characteristics of
temperature. This is called a representational mapping that is homomorphic to the
relations of the empirical structure in question.117 Balaguer simply shows that there
are only some indispensable mathematical theories for our empirical sciences, and
that these indispensable mathematical theories can be nominalized118.
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Ibid. pg. 112, a homomorphism refers to a structure that replaces another structure and is equivalent
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Ibid. Ch. 6, this chapter deals with the nominalization of Quantum Mechanics from a fictionalist
point of view. Because QM can be nominalized, it is possible to nominalize other empirical structures
which require the aid of mathematics, the only thing that we say differently under fictionalism is that
these structures are fictions.
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4. Economic Methodology
Section 3 dealt with providing a basic metaphysical framework of analysis in which
mathematics is grounded. This basic metaphysical framework serves as the
foundation upon which “economics” can occur—specifically, mathematical
economics. With the rise of the mathematization of economics, it has been assumed
that mathematics in general inherently has an indubitable logical foundation at its
core. At first glance, it seems that this is the case, mathematics, does seem to provide
a foundation upon which the acquisition of knowledge occurs irrefutably. The
purpose of this section is to draw a correlation between the metaphysical foundations
of mathematics, and its methodological implications in economics.
Kevin Hoover’s review of four seminal works in the methodology of
economics rightly points out why methodology matters in economics. This is
precisely the title of his review. In it, Hoover provides a realist defense of the new
classical programme of research for economics. This realist defense can be construed
obviously in its platonic correlate. The four main works reviewed in Hoover’s “Why
does methodology matter for Economics” are Mark Blaug’s The Methodology of
Economics: Or How Economists explain; Daniel Hausman’s The Inexact and
Separate Science of Economics; Alexander Rosenberg’s Economics: Mathematical
Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns?; and Lawrence Boland’s The Principles
of Economics: Some Lies my Teachers told me. Blaug is characterized as a
“falsificationalist” following the Popperian/Lakatosian tradition.119 Blaug’s
definition of methodology (as quoted in Hoover) is:
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…a study of the relationship between theoretical concepts and warranted
conclusions about the real world; in particular, methodology is that branch of
economics where we examine the ways in which economists justify their
theories and the reasons they offer for preferring one theory over another;
methodology is both a descriptive discipline - "this is what most economists
do" - and a prescriptive one - "this is what economists should do to advance
economics"…120
There is a good reason to start with Blaug’s definition of methodology. We get a
rough idea of why it might be good to understand the “behind the scenes” working to
uphold economic theorizing and applications.
Hoover’s criticism of Rosenberg lies in portraying Rosenberg as merely
philosophizing about economics, without generating a general critique about
economics from particulars.121
According to Rosenberg, as rightly pointed out by Hoover’s review of
Rosenberg (1992), economics belongs as a branch of applied mathematics.122
Rosenberg’s critique of the current state of economics is its lack of progress between
theorizing and predictability (two important components of a research programme –
i.e. as seen in Newtonian mechanics). Rosenberg’s attack on the current state of the
economics enterprise123 is precisely directed at economics-as-mathematical-politics.
According to Rosenberg, economists use mathematics as a tool to justify statements
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This might be a controversial way of bundling up neoclassical economics and its correlates. Kevin
Hoover demands that we do away with the term “neoclassical economics” and we rename it “New
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about the economy which might not have very much merit. Thus, Rosenberg states
that the “intentions” of economists aren’t academic or scientific, but political. In
Rosenberg’s analysis, the “political” of economics can be characterized as an
oligarchical dictatorship, where a set of economists have the only means
(mathematics) by which economics is “properly done.”
Rosenberg compares economics to meteorology. Hoover rightly points out
that the state of technology in economics and meteorology have both improved, and
therefore, Rosenberg’s critique and comparison do not hold—that is, it is not the case,
as Rosenberg claims, that the economics enterprise fails completely to predict
economic phenomena. Economics doesn’t fail anymore than meteorology to predict
the weather. Hoover’s “refutation” of Rosenberg’s critique seems to lie in the fact
that we have improved our method of collecting and predicting economic behavior.124
Rosenberg’s critique goes much deeper than meteorology. A better way to
critique Rosenberg’s critique of the economics enterprise would be the fact that
Rosenberg states that the theory of supply & demand is analogous to Euclidean
geometry. Rosenberg’s argument starts by stating that supply & demand are
assertions about the economic space we observe. Rosenberg then compares supply &
demand to Euclidean geometry. The last step is to show that Euclidean geometry is
shown to be false given the developments in non-Euclidean geometry (mainly
Einstein’s work on relativity which makes use of non-Euclidean geometry to show
that the Euclidean view is actually false).125 According to Rosenberg, supply &
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demand are “vacuous” as theoretical terms because they rely on something that has
long been done away with in physics. Given that Euclidean geometry is false, why is
it that we use a false structure to describe the economic realm? Our analysis in
section 2 deals with arithmetic because it is the simplest (yet complicated) way to
uncover the philosophical problems at hand. Kevin Hoover skips over this part of
Rosenberg’s critique, which is extremely valuable methodologically. Hoover’s
defense of the current economics enterprise is summarized with the following
metaphor: it is better to have a house with a leaking roof, than no house at all.126
Hoover fails to capture Rosenberg’s deeper insight and its effect on
economic methodology. Rosenberg asserts that microeconomics (in which
ultimately, game theory takes the front seat) is a ‘maximal theory.’ A ‘maximal
theory’ seeks to “maximize” or “minimize” something within the theoretical
framework. In the case of neoclassical economics, analogously to Newtonian
mechanics, Rosenberg states that the model of neoclassical economics behaves in a
‘maximal’ way—the goal of the theoretical model is to “maximize” or “minimize”
something. It is in this spirit that the individual in neoclassical economics
microeconomics is built.127
Evolutionary biology presents an interesting case of comparison, according to
Rosenberg. Evolutionary biology uses differential calculus to state that organisms
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maximize “fitness.” It is arguably the case that the use of a “maximal” theory fits
evolutionary biology better than economics given that evolutionary biology does not
make any claims about individual organisms behaving in a certain manner linked to
mathematical formulations.128 In this light, Rosenberg’s critique can bear some
fruitful conversation about economics. Hoover’s simplistic “refutation” of Rosenberg
seems to miss this point.129 Thus, Rosenberg’s insight about neoclassical economics,
specifically game theory, is that it might not be as fruitful to apply principles of
differential calculus to economics as these methods are applied in natural systems
(physics, or biology).130 Rosenberg points out that the success of evolutionary
biology and physics do not give methodological credence to economics.131
Kevin Hoover’s review proceeds with Mark Blaug’s book The Methodology
of Economics, or how Economists Explain. Hoover characterizes Blaug’s
methodology as belonging to the Lakatosian/Popperian tradition of “falsificationism.”
Falsificationism sets out to test hypotheses about scientific phenomena (and of
course, economic phenomena as well).132 Thus, Blaug’s concern as a
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“falsificationist” is that the economics enterprise does not “properly” test its
theories—Blaug calls current economic theorizing “innocuous falsificationism.”
According to Hoover, Blaug’s worry as a “falsificationist” is misplaced because one
can only hope for “innocuous falsificationism.”133
Blaug’s Ch. 3 presents verificationism as prehistory of methodology of
economics. Verificationism deals with a priori truths and how to verify them. What
is interesting about verificationism is that there is inherently no attempt to work out a
“methodology” in order to formulate hypotheses.134 Verificationism assumes that
theory of choice is true (by assumption), and the task of the researcher is to “verify”
that the theory is true. According to Blaug, Adam Smith’s case is of most importance
for economics. Adam Smith attempts to give a version of verificationism especially in
The Wealth of Nations.135
Another important figure in the history of economics is John Stuart Mill. John
Stuart Mill’s 1836 essay On the Definition of Political Economy which begins with a
definition of economic man. According to John Stuart Mill, referring to the economic
man as a whole would require a lot, and basically, economic man is too complicated.
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What is important to notice is the call of the a priori as a precondition for the methodology of
economics by Smith.

54

Thus, John Stuart Mill suggests creating a “fictional” economic man—where the
purpose of economic analysis (then political economy proper) is to get at the basics of
this “fictional” economic man. Mill’s methodological move to construct a “fictional”
economic man allows us to analyze the way in which the “fictional” economic man’s
goals are to maximize wealth with as little sacrifice as possible.136 Mill thus calls for
an a priori method tied to verificationism. Maximizing wealth is not a “fact” we can
verify. Insofar as the science of political economy goes, it fails to prove what we
hypothesize as the behavior of the “fictional” economic man if we try to apply it to
real world situations. The solution to this problem is that we should seek to verify
our theories about our “fictional” economic man. Mill calls for a priori statements,
which are then corroborated by a posteriori statements which are supposed to be the
result of “philosophical investigation”—this very process of investigation is deemed
verificationism. That is, we shouldn’t try to falsify our economic theories. It is rather
a method of verification that we should seek to verify our assertions made before any
investigation is done (a priori).137 Mark Blaug points out that this type of
verificationism leads Mill to limit his analysis to “tendency laws.” These tendency
laws are what are at the bottom of the phenomena we observe in the world (whether
in physics or economics). The importance in mentioning physics or other sciences for
Mill, is that it is clear for Mill that there exist “Laws” for which we can apply the a
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priori/a posteriori formulation. This formulation ‘comes into its own, not as a way of
discovering truth, but as a way of verifying it’.138
What is important about this is the lineage in methodology that is clearly
represented by ceteris paribus statements widely used in economics today.
As Blaug states:
[a] tendency statement in economics can be regarded, therefore, as a
promissory note that is only redeemed when the ceteris paribus clause has
been spelled out and taken into account, preferably in quantitative terms139
Furthermore, Blaug states that ceteris paribus statements are a “sort of catchall”
statements for all that is unknown. In comparison to the physical sciences (physics,
chemistry, biology), ceteris paribus statements are used in a restrictive sense which
does not encompass the whole of the theory at hand.140 Blaug further states that
unless there is a restriction placed on these ceteris paribus clauses (the restriction
amounts to “disturbances” on the system being analyzed), they are useless as attempts
to blanket other “causes” in the analysis that is being carried out.
John Stuart Mill was aware of some of these issues which he tried to address
in his System of Logic (1843). Mill’s system of logic tries to “demolish” Kant’s
foundational epistemology (that is how synthetic a priori statements can come to
be).141 Blaug’s analysis of Mill’s Logic renders Mill as an important figure in the
philosophy of science, but rather than to label Mill’s Logic as a theoretical account of
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logic, Blaug wants to label it “an analysis of the scientific method relating to the
evaluation of evidence.” Mill’s contributions to economics, in his Logic deal with the
way in which logical induction is made. Mill’s canons of induction are “a set of nondemonstrable rules of confirmation.” Mill tries to solve Hume’s problem of induction
using his four methods of agreement. 142 Blaug further points out that Mill’s
indiscriminate use of the term induction “largely spoils” the rest of the Logic.143
Ultimately, Mill’s “logic” neither solves Hume’s induction problem, nor even
attempts to “defeat” Kant’s epistemology. Mill neither succeeds in stating how it is
possible that we acquire knowledge following Kant’s project; or how we go from
impressions to knowledge following Hume’s challenge to Kant. Instead Mill takes
over Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism.144 Bentham’s utilitarianism is founded on
methodological individualism (that is, economic agents are atomic units in the
economy). Mill’s ultimate goal was to provide the methodological foundation for the
social sciences in general. Mill did not call for a “descriptive” type of
methodological individualism which attempts to describe how economic agents truly
are in their “atomic” state. Mill attempts to develop a normative account the
economy, and economic agents (in terms of methodological individualism). Blaug
142
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states, “[e]ven those who are most sympathetic to Mill’s economics agree that he was
at best a lukewarm verificationist.”145
In the section on verificationism, Blaug has one last segment on modern
Austrians, among whom the notable are Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. The
case of Mises is of particular interest because of the poignant assertion that he is on
Kantian ground. Ludwig von Mises was against any form of verificationism, or
empiricism which looked anything like scientific research which had been taking
place in the tradition of Mill among others. Von Mises central claim was that all
human intentions were based on an underlying purpose (which is formulated in a
radical mode of a priorism).146 What is important to notice about the modern
Austrians, especially von Mises is his reluctance to give in to the temptation of
indiscriminate use of mathematics in economics.
Von Mises wants to follow Kant in his “synthetic a priori” method. Von
Mises, however, falls short in his critique of the use of mathematics in economics.
Von Mises thinks that mathematics is at the root of the problem in economic theory.
Mathematics, as argued by Kant (section 2 above) is supposed to be the foundation of
knowledge, and science. Thus, economists will agree that mathematics makes the
analysis clearer by putting all the assumptions about the specific model on the table
(whether economists think about the implications about the use of mathematics is a
different story). Von Mises misses Kant’s point in the Prolegomena with respect to
the intimate connection between science, mathematics, and epistemology. The whole
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of Kant’s project is due to this connection. Just referring to terms such as “synthetic a
priori” and the like without any regard to Kant’s original insight is misguided.147
Following the prehistory of methodology, Blaug gives an account of the
methodology of economics in the 20th century. Many of the developments seem to be
a continuation of Mill’s project stemming from his Logic and his seminal essay On
the Definition of Political Economy. As one of my professors used to say when
teaching us advanced micro-economics: “it’s the same story, I just ramp-up the
math!” The same story goes for the methodology of economics, as mathematical
techniques in economics become more sophisticated, the importance to maintain an
eye towards ontological problems get’s even more hushed up.
The main methodological techniques of the 20th century take several forms of
falsificationism (this is to be differentiated to the rigorous falsificationism for which
Blaug calls).
Paul Samuelson’s 1949 The Operational Significance of Economic Theory
brings the research programme of “Operationalism.” Operationalism, according to
Samuelson, deals with deriving ‘operationally meaningful theorems.’ A meaningful
theorem, according to Samuelson, is ‘simply a hypothesis about empirical data which
could conceivably be refuted if under ideal conditions.’148 Blaug analysis of
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Ibid. pg. 87 Blaug notes that this formulation differs from the Operationalism in the Philosophy of
Science laid down by Percy Bridgeman’s The Nature of Physical Theory (1936) which deals with
connecting “abstract concepts physical theory to the experimental operations of concrete physical
measurement (ibid. pg. 88).” For another important statement similarly made in economics is Alan
Gibbard and Hal Varian’s “Economic Models” which states that capturing reality whole is an

59

Samuelson’s “Operationalism” in particular is that it is undermined by the lack of
clarity to specify a more fundamental mode of falsification—Blaug’s characterization
of Operationalism (at least Samuelson’s brand) is to say that it is merely empirical.149
Samuelson’s attempt to formulate a clear project for economists seems to fail
in clarifying exactly the relationship between the theory and the falsification that is to
take place given the theory at hand.150 The whole of Samuelson’s project is to study
economic phenomena as they appear in the world by way of positing the economic
phenomena’s dynamic stability, then via “causal empiricism,” provide proof of the
economic phenomena as it actually is through the model that is posited. Samuelson’s
project aims at formulating a theory in a “realistic” manner. That is, a theory which
deals with connecting the “real world” to the economic theories at issue.151
Milton Friedman’s seminal “Essay on the Methodology of Positive
Economics” (1953) comes precisely to the aid of aspiring economists. Although it is
difficult to discern what Friedman “really” meant in this essay with regards to
“positive economics” Blaug’s statement about the essay will do for now.152 The main
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statement for Friedman’s 1953 essay is the “irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis.” This
thesis states that the assumptions on which a theory is grounded (that is, the set of
axioms which lie in support of the theory at hand) do not matter as long as the theory
has explanatory power. A theory’s explanatory power is how well the theory is
“confirmed” by experience.153 The term “Unrealistic” is to be stripped of any
metaphysical connotation. “Unrealistic” simply means the way in which the
hypothesis, and its assumptions are able to incorporate (and explain) the economic
variables that the hypothesis is trying to explain in the world. Friedman rightly points
out that the whole of scientific analysis is full of such “unrealistic assumptions.” This
point is worth exploring in a bit of detail. The example that comes under analysis is
the perfect competition/monopolistic competition framework, and maximization of
profit in economics. According to Friedman, when we assume that there is perfect
competition in the (actual) market place, and that businessmen seek to maximize
profits, we are merely stating “abstracting from reality.” Abstracting from reality
refers to the use of economic models in order to analyze what truly is going in the
economy. According to Friedman, whether these assumptions are “realistic” has no
bearing on our theory (that economic agents seek to maximize profit, and that the
structure under which this maximization takes place is perfect competition). The
Darwinian process of rivalry will assure that the agents who actually maximize will

fit in a framework of scientific realism (how scientific phenomena behave under an objective
structure). Mäki’s analysis allows us to move beyond the segmented and, thus far unclear account of
economic methodology.
153
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its assumptions.’
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survive.154 Friedman’s “methodology” even goes further than this. Blaug calls into
question the way in which assumptions might be used to support (formulate) a
hypothesis:
1) statements of motivation such as utility and profit maximization; 2)
statements of overt behavior of economic agents; 3) statements of
functionality and stability of certain functional relationships; 4) restrictions on
the range of variables taken into account; and 5) boundary conditions under
which the theory is held to apply.155
The methodological way in specifying each of these assumptions is not
straightforward. One has to really look at the issues at hand (for which assumption 3
is useful). The purpose of these “assumptions,” according to Friedman, is to allow
economists a ground upon which they conduct their research without having to make
any methodological claims. Milton Friedman’s “irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis”
merely ignores any need to deal with such questions—ultimately what this leads to
treating business firms as “black boxes” from which all theorizing and hypothesizing
takes place. This framework, allows for the theories about maximizing agents and
perfect competition to be “unfalsifiable;” unfalsifiable theories are not subject to
questioning, or disproof, they are simply working frameworks that can never be
debunked.156

154

Ibid. pg. 92 This is an interesting point which definitely has been of much use. Minkler (1999)
provides a detailed analysis of what “Darwinism” might entail in the atomist/individualistic economic
agent. Minkler concludes that individualistic-type competition would have in fact killed off humans
long ago. The “Darwinism” that has more potential is the group-type. Groups are essentially more
able to carry out social plans (reproduction, governance etc.)…What is interesting is that Adam Smith
himself sees this group link, although it works in a metaphysical way (as an “invisible hand.”) Thus, it
is not at all clear that the individualistic/atomistic “Darwinism” to which Friedman makes reference is
substantial enough to allow Friedman’s hypothesis of maximizing returns to hold.
155

Ibid. pg. 94

156

Ibid. pg. 96

62

Kevin Hoover’s “Why does methodology matter for Economics,” seems to
agree with Mark Blaug’s characterization of present day mainstream economics as a
field that practices “innocuous falsificationism.”157 As stated above,
“falsificationism” deals with empirical “testing” regarding economics (or any other
type) theories in order to determine which theory is better. By “better,” we mean to
say that the theory explains the behavior of the phenomena which the theory intends
to describe. Hoover’s assertion about economics is that “innocuous falsificationism”
is the best thing for which we can hope. If we are to be “innocuous” about debunking
our economic theories, our intent regarding economic theories in general is not to
debunk those theories but gather data which “fits” those theories (e.g. Rosengberg’s
charge on economics being mere “curve fitting.”) Hoover, however, does not take
into account Rosenberg’s critique of mathematical economics as it relates to
connecting theory with the world—a story clearly corroborated by Blaug’s account of
the methodology of economics culminating in Friedman’s 1953 essay.
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5. NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS (OR SOME DERIVATIVE THEREOF)
Section 4 dealt with giving a brief account of the methodology of economics,
it seems that one can draw a well defined (almost unchanged) line from the time of
Mill up until the time of Friedman’s 1953 essay. This section deals with the question
about mainstream economics from a historical perspective, its lack of change, and its
implementation of mathematics as a theoretical grounding.
5.1 Neoclassical Economics Defined
Neoclassical economics comes directly from Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism
found in the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Secondly, Neoclassical economics
is also directly linked to Locke’s An Essay on Human Understanding. Although the
nomenclature changes, the basic framework for economic methodology slightly
changes to accommodate a strand of utility theory advanced by Bentham. The study
of economics remains, in neoclassical economics, as the study of a natural system.158
The evolution of economic theorizing has led us to rely on the mathematization of
economic theory. As we saw in section 2, Kant’s project sets out to ground
knowledge in general, and particularly in science via mathematics. Thus, we have a
good argument why this mathematization occurs. Almost two centuries later, Milton
Friedman’s Essays in Positive Economics sets out to derive a “value-free” economic
methodology, and what a better way to do this than through mathematics.159 This
section revisits neoclassical economics to its past. In doing so, we see that this has
specific implications for economic methodology.
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Locke provides the perfect human psychology on which neoclassical
economists are able to build models. The Lockean view deals with the inner
subjectivity of individuals. This inner subjectivity is disentangled from the world.160
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations synthesizes the chaotic view of the individual (as in
Hobbes) with the Lockean (more coherent) view. The Wealth of Nations does this by
calling upon an invisible hand. Individual subjectivities come together in the market
place, and through the aid of the invisible hand of the market, form a continuous
social whole. Smith simply continues Locke’s idea about individual subjectivity
through his formulation of competitive individuals in the market.161 Furthermore, for
Smith, the interaction of competitive individuals in the market reveals an underlying
psychology about individuals. Smith did not directly engage in trying to investigate
behavior by individuals in specific settings (rather, the market arises as a natural
system from the behavior of individuals and individuals’ self-interest).162 For Smith,
self-interest creates social cohesion by creating interdependent economic relations
among individuals.
John Davis characterization of Adam Smith is what Davis calls Scottish
Enlightenment Dualism. Dualism refers to “mental states,” and their correspondence
with “activity” and objects in the world. Dualism has an underlying type of
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metaphysics which seeks to point to every “correspondence” between what goes on in
the brain, and phenomena in the world. That is, every act, and every object is linked
to thoughts. Dualism does not provide a way to distinguish imaginary objects from
“real” ones. This Locke/Smith formulation of the individual is taken up by
neoclassical economists.163
Neoclassical economists ignore any type of reference to philosophy, which would not
only help economics deal with these types of problems, but also construct better
theoretical models.
Neoclassical economics takes after Adam Smith but rejects everything but the
way in which the market mechanism works. John Davis summarizes the neoclassical
argument as follows:
Individuals are unique among all possible units of analysis in economic
life because their behavior alone can be understood in terms of choice.
2) Choice can only be explained in reference to individuals’ inner states, that
is, their private tastes and desires, because this is the basis on which
individuals discriminate among their options.
3) Individuals discriminate among their options because they apply
marginalist principles.
4) Marginalist principles explain markets because they account for the
determination of prices164
1)

Any further development of mainstream economic theory resembles this formulation.
Davis’ characterization of neoclassical economics allows us to make explicit two
points which are carried through the rest of our analysis of game theory (defined
below). First, individuals are independent of their environment. Second, everything
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is explained by choices made by individuals in the economy. Using choice as a mode
of analysis for the economy, neoclassical economists “solve” any problems dealing
with the psychology of individuals. Neoclassical economics is “rigorously” defended
with the rise of game theory. With the development of game theory, the attempt to
solve problems about the economy given the complexity of individuals is merely
reworded more sophisticated jargon, but the same neoclassical statements about
individuals and the economy.
5.2 Evolution in Terminology, not in Economic Theory
One of the main platforms for neoclassical economics is the reduction of the
individual to a maximizing agent. The main assumption about individuals in general
is that they are “rational” with respect to their actions. This means that they follow
the best set of actions which will best satisfy the agent’s ends.165 Individuals have
‘objective functions’ which they maximize.166
The nineteenth century saw the rise of neoclassical marginalism. Among the
distinguished economists are Gossens, Jevons, Menger, Walras and Marshall. These
economists held that the “individual’s objectives are associated with the psychology
of wants and desires.”167 John Davis states that the formulation of the individual does
not change from Jeremy Bentham’s formulation of the individual basically ruled by
pain and pleasure. Neoclassical marginalism sought to take the individual’s
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“psychology” further by attributing a measurement—this theory receives the name of
“cardinal utility theory.” Cardinal utility theory states that everything can be
measured quantitatively. The primary influence of this idea is Jeremy Bentham’s
Principles of Morals and Legislation.
For Bentham, human psychology was subject to the sovereign masters of pain
and pleasure.168 Individuals are under the rule of these “masters,” and perform a
calculus which seeks pleasure and avoids pain.169 The calculus of pain and pleasure
was an actual calculation, according to Bentham, to decide what course of action
would be better depending on the amount of pleasure produced. For Bentham, as
well for the early marginalists in the nineteenth century, this calculus was cardinal—
that is, possible to measure as a quantity, such as weight and height.170 Thus,
neoclassical economics, in its early development resembles Bentham’s cardinal
utilitarianism.171 The 20th century saw a different development in utility theory. The
focus now was shifted to the ordinality of preferences—ordinal utility theory.
Economists very quickly realized that utility was in fact not like weight or height.
According to Davis, Pareto (1979 [1909])172 made the first step towards
distancing economic theorizing from human psychology. Pareto’s formulation is in
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terms of individuals’ preference173 combinations. For Pareto, and this development
of neoclassical economics, rank ordering has nothing in particular in reference to
individual psychology. The key to this type of analysis arrives at preferences from
individuals that are “revealed” from individuals’ choices.174
Hicks and Allen (1934)175 develop Pareto’s ordinal utility framework into
indifference curves.176 Robins (1935 [1932], 1938) goes as far as to make
interpersonal comparisons of utility among economic agents (which lead to policy
recommendations).177 Davis points out that these particular statements of utility and
the individual are part of what Davis calls “emotivist ethics.” Emotivist ethics sets
out to describe ethical judgments in terms of individuals’ emotions or attitudes.178 If
we look at the case of either the Benthamite formulation of “human nature” with
respect to what ought to be done ethically, we see that Bentham emphasizes quite
clearly that ethical judgments are derived from “objective” concepts—pleasure and
pain. This is not the case with the later formulations of utility. The naturalistic
framework with which Bentham develops his utilitarianism seeks to arrive at ethical
judgments from objective natural states (pleasure and pain). The nineteenth century
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development of ordinal utility complicates the Benthamite formulation by asserting
that ethical judgments come from individuals’ emotions or attitudes. Thus, there is a
shift from “nature,” in Bentham, and the subjective emotions and attitudes of
individuals.179 If we are to derive ethical judgments from individuals’ attitudes or
emotions, we are only left with individuals’ judgments about ethics and the economy.
If we are to derive any objective framework which does not depend on the subjective
attitudes of individuals, it is only through reference to that objective framework that
we can arrive at doing so (see section 6.3 below). However, if we only state that
individuals have subjective attitudes towards the ethical or economic realm, we are
left with just those subjective attitudes towards the economic or ethical realms,
without attempting to discern what the actual economic or ethical realm. 180
The 20th century is the story of Paul Samuelson and “revealed preferences.”
Paul Samuelson undermines utility theory and moves away to revealed and axiomatic
preferences. Samuelson’s project is to have a theory of choice that does away with
any reference to psychology and individual subjectivity (Samuelson 1938).
Preferences do not dictate individual choices. Instead, choices “reveal” an
individual’s preferences (Samuelson 1948).181 Paul Samuelson’s project was to
model economic theory to make it as “scientific” as possible by using models from
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thermodynamics.182 Samuelson’s influenced economics by restating the utility in
terms of choice formally—that is mathematically. In “Some Psychological Aspects
of Mathematics and Economics” Samuelson provides an argument for the complete
mathematization of economics. He divides the “literal” economists from the
mathematical economists. This division, he admits, is an arbitrary one. What
Samuelson states is that it is possible to reduce economics to formal mathematics.183
Samuelson’s call for the non-mathematician is to become one.184
As Davis clearly points out, the critique of neoclassical economics does not
stick because they are “not trying to explain human psychology.” Instead their aim is
to explain human choice. But in order to do this neoclassical economists resort need
to start with economic agents and their exogenous preferences.185
Since neoclassical economics must be purely formal, they resort to
“methodological individualism” to accomplish this. This, according to Davis, is the
“last ditch defense” for neoclassical economics. The mathematization of economics
gives rise to “methodological individualism” (where economic agents are
homogeneous atomic agents).186 What follows from this is that reductionism takes
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place. Reductionism, in philosophy of science, states that if a theory can be explained
by a simpler (more fundamental) theory, than the larger theory can be reduced to the
simpler theory.187 The criterion for reductionism is to translate the less fundamental
theory into the simpler theory (via “bridge laws”). Secondly, all explanations in the
less fundamental theory must be translated to the simpler, thus eliminating the
unnecessary elements from the less fundamental theory, in order to express
everything in terms of the simpler theory.188
New Classical Economics189 (differentiated from neoclassical) is an attempt to
be the ultimate defense of neoclassical economics by resorting to general equilibrium
models. New Classical Economics stems is based on modeling general equilibrium in
the economy based on individual preferences, endowments and technology. The well
known Debreu-Arrow-McKensie general equilibrium model attempts to explain
individual preferences, endowments, and technology (in the aggregate) via
fluctuations in unemployment.190 Davis concludes that these models make “global”
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assumptions that are critical for the models, which cannot be derived from individual
behavior.191
Davis’ critique of the various derivations of neoclassical economics seems to
be a core critique in philosophy of science. Davis presents an array of economic
views which deal with the main line of economic thought to date. Davis concludes
that the way in which economics is done by neoclassical economics overlooks
questions about the nature of the individual and the economy. However harsh Davis’
critique might seem to neoclassical economists, Roy Weintraub thinks that
economists in general do not need to philosophy of science. Philosophy of science
deals with the philosophical commitments and statements of scientific theories.
Weintraub thinks that this type of analysis is at a level too high to have impact in
economics’ practice.192 That is, economists should worry about the practical aspects
of economics. “Philosophical questions” should be left to philosophers of science
and methodologists. For Weintraub takes methodologists to have little to do with the
“inside” economic practice. Weintraub’s main targets are Alexander Rosenberg and
Donald McCloskey. Rosenberg is seen as a mere “Methodologist.” Weintraub takes
Rosenberg’s critique of Neoclassical economics (among other brands of economic
theory)193 to be mere “metatheorizing.” Rosenberg’s critique of neoclassical
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economics starts from the fact that neoclassical economics has not produced the same
empirical results as biology or physics. These “results” are in terms of predictability
of the phenomena that each of these is trying to explain. Since neoclassical
economics fails to bring about the same results empirically, Rosenberg questions the
credibility of neoclassical economics.194
McCloskey on the other hand, in The Rhetoric of Economics, argues that
economics need not concern itself with epistemic problems (problems about how we
acquire knowledge in general). McCloskey’s argument is that all that matters is the
“art of argument,” and discussion which might arise from economics as a discipline.
Weintraub states that both Rosenberg and McCloskey are simply “wrong.”
Weintraub comes to the defense of everyday economists (economists in practice) and
states that any criticism by a philosopher of science lies “outside” of economics.195
Thus, according to Weintraub, the work of philosophers of science is redundant and
has no practical impact for everyday economists. Weintraub’s defense of neoclassical
economists (among the rest) lies precisely here. The outsider’s perspective cannot
193
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permit philosophers of science to impact the methodology of everyday economists. It
is clear that Weintraub thinks that economists stick pretty close to the ground (in
terms of metaphysics), thus they are “safe” from any “metatheorizing.” But, it is
arguably the case that economists in general, including neoclassical economists make
metaphysical claims without knowing. Even when these metaphysical claims are
known, the metaphysical claims are narrow and at times implausible. Metaphysical
claims by everyday economists take the form of “models” and these models should be
analyzed thoroughly.196
5.3 Game Theory, Intentionality, & Welfare
Game theory has its inception in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1944 Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior. Von Neumann and Morgenstern stem their analysis
of the individual agent from better wanting to understand the behavior of oligopolistic
and monopolistic firms. From their analysis of these types of firms, von Neumann
and Morgenstern state that individual economic agents are “bearers of strategies.”
Treating individuals as bearers of strategies gave way to another explanation of
individual behavior, “supraindividual” institutions, convention and social rules. 197 In
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the tradition of Walrasian equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium is the outcome of the
aggregate of strategies by individuals in the economy.198
John B. Davis duly asks if individuals considered as “bearers of strategies” do
any better in explaining the individual, and whether avoids the problems in
neoclassical economics. The first problem we encounter is with respect to “being a
bearer of strategies.” Davis points out that this characterization of the individual
allows for a non-exclusive relation between the individual and the strategies. That is,
rather than to specify a particular type of rational individual who will act in the
economy in a certain psychological way, the “bearer of strategy” definition of the
individual is not to be tied to any particular type of psychological behavior.199 Thus,
Davis concludes that this game theoretic characterization of the individual rejects
Locke’s conception of the individual as possessing a subjective inwardness.200 A
consequence of the game theoretic formulation of strategies allows game theorists not
to give explanations as to why a player might pursue one strategy over another—
Game theorists do not say because players have such-and-such type strategies,
games will have certain outcomes. They ask, should players have such-andsuch types of strategy, what outcomes might games have?201
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This game theoretic formulation ultimately shows the ongoing agnosticism by
neoclassical economists about any normative claim—and thus, by remaining in the
“descriptive” realm, they “avoid” value-laden claims.
The problem of reductionism, according to Davis, remains in game theory.
Reductionism refers to how theories might be “reduced” to simpler, more compact
theories. The “bearer of strategy” formulation is an atomist-holist equilibrium
analysis. Rather than to present an account of economic agents in connection to
social institutions, conventions, and social rules, the game theoretic formulation
assumes this connection. Game theorists depend on “consistent alignment of beliefs”
(CAB) and common knowledge rationality (CKN).202 What follows from CAB and
CKN is that individuals with the same information prior to any game will come to the
same conclusion.203 In order to simplify the problem, consistent alignment of beliefs
and common knowledge rationality must be asserted. Common alignment of beliefs
states that agents will not have conflicting beliefs about anything; whereas common
knowledge rationality states that when it comes to knowledge that is imposed on
economic agents, the reaction of agents in relation to that knowledge would be the
same. If agents interact with social institutions for example, these social institutions
will have the same impact on economic agents because they all have “common
knowledge” about these social institutions. Common knowledge is regarded as
something that is known to all the economic agents. If economic agents act against
202
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this “common knowledge,” then the particular action of the agent is considered
“irrational.” Davis points out that the common knowledge rationality would follow
nicely from having to deal with social institutions if individuals were actually as they
are described in game theory.204 Common alignment of beliefs is harder to imagine
without a social foundation of some sort. Rather, game theorists stick to their
individualistic “strategy bearing” agent models.205
John B. Davis provides an account of game theory at its general level, and
although we get a general idea of what problems might arise, Davis’ project has taken
us far enough. Alexander Rosenberg206 provides a more detailed account of game
theory and rational choice. Prediction makes a science exact, and increase in
prediction increases the accuracy of a science. In the case of economics, since it is
dealing with human choice, it is harder to come to prediction as it is the case in
physics and biology. Rational choice theory is the main founding block of game
theory (and arguably neoclassical economics). Rational choice theory (in addition to
what has been discussed above) as it is formalized in game theory deals with the
choices of economic agents. Rosenberg, (as many others) points out that the idea that
agents are “rational” is suspect. Rosenberg’s conclusion is that economic agents are
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in fact irrational.207 This is but the start of the line of problems that plague rational
choice theory.
Daniel Hausman’s The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics presents
the rational choice theory and its basic foundations—utility maximization, the weak
axiom of revealed preference (WARP), and rationality and uncertainty: expected
utility theory.208
It is said that economic agents maximize utility (an economic agent’s index of
preferences). As Hausman, states, to state that agents “maximize utility” is to state
nothing about the agent’s preferences. All that this means is that we can connect an
agent’s preferences with choices—“Rational individuals rank available alternatives
and choose what they most prefer.”209 Thus, the working framework for rational
choice theory is:
[agent] A’s preferences are rational if and only if:
(1) A’s preferences are complete,
(2) A’s preferences are transitive, and
(3) A’s preferences are continuous.
An agent’s A’s choices are rational if and only if:
(1) A’s preferences are rational and
(2) A prefers no option to the one A chooses210
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Hausman states that rational choice theory is a normative theory (despite attempts by
some to unqualifyingly deem it descriptive because of its mathematical rigor)—“[t]o
define what rational choice and preference are, is ipso facto to say how one ought
rationally to prefer and to choose.”211 Hausman further states that rational choice
theory may be taken as “positive.” Even when rational choice theory is “positive,”
one still has the limitation of rationality as defined by rational choice theory. The
level of generality of these preferences not only speaks to economic activity, but
psychology as well.
Samuelson’s 1938 “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Choice”
attempts to formulate a completely positive account of rational choice theory, but
instead of rationality, revealed preferences take center stage. In order not to rely on
preferences and choices, revealed-preference theory comes in the picture (as already
mentioned above, this takes our attention away from the actual agent and shifts it to
his preferences that are “revealed.” The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP)
serves as the foundation for revealed-preference theory.
The WARP indicates that if it is revealed that agent A prefers x to y, then it
will always be revealed that x is preferred to y. Thus, the conclusion to be drawn
from WARP is that if x is revealed to be preferred to y, then agent A must always
choose x over y.212 The obvious problems for this are pointed out by (Sen 1977)
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where an agent might choose something that the agent does not prefer; or the agent’s
preferences might have changed altogether (Hirschman 1985).213
As if these problems aren’t enough, Hausman points out that revealedpreference theory faces four further serious objections. (Harsanyi 1977) shows that if
agent A chooses x when y is available, then y when x is available, then agent A is not
irrational—agent A is indifferent between x and y. Hausman states that if agent A is
indifferent between x and y, then it would take a series of trials before we figure out
what the agent’s preferences are, which violates the WARP.214
The second objection deals with considering agents as “bearers of strategies.”
In the language of game theory, economic agents are “players” which are found in
“games.” Thus, players make decisions in terms of the rules of game theory
depending on preferences. Players might do something other than their preference to
mislead other players.215 Hausman example deals with the prisoner’s dilemma game.
The prisoner’s dilemma is a game about two prisoners which are captured, then
questioned in separate rooms. If they both “cooperate,” meaning if they “tell” on the
other prisoner, this is considered to be the best outcome because they will both get
shorter sentences for cooperating. The game theory “prediction” states that the
players will always want to “not cooperate” and incriminate on the other player. The

213

Ibid. pg. 22, Hausman’s reference is Sen’s 1977 “Rational Fool’s,” specially sections VI-VIII, and
Hirschman’s “Against Parsimony, Three Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic
Discourse.”
214

Ibid. pg. 22

215

This objection does not fully stick because, then the game theorist states that in this case, the
expected value of the game must be calculated for the player to “randomize.” That is, for the player to
play something which is not a high preference, the player’s expectations for payoffs must outweigh the
cost of loosing if the player’s “bluff is called.”

81

player who tells on the other player then gets none punishment whereas the other
player gets all of it. Hausman states that this game leads to “suboptimal outcomes.”
The conclusion that game theorists draw from the prisoner’s dilemma is that prisoners
do not cooperate (that is they stick to their story instead of turning themselves in),
which is a worse outcome than if both cooperated (which is the case many times).
Thus, Hausman argues, players’ preferences are misconstrued. Hausman states that
the analogy to be drawn from this game is about market failures. If there is a market
failure, then the rational thing to do is to cooperate.216
The third objection deals with completeness. The completeness assumption
deals with agent’s rankings—all of them. That is, an economic agent is required to
have a full rank of all the preferences available—and to be had (in the future)…as
already stated, this complicates the already mentioned preference changes, and
choices for objects which are not preferred.
Revealed-preference theory supposedly gets rid of the subjective economic
agent. Revealed-preference theory fails to rid itself of the subject because economic
agents have desires, and these desires lead to choices. The common thread among
game theorists is to try to come up with a rational version of the individual linked to
mathematical formulations. But as we have seen, this is done at the expense of a
coherent, more plausible account of the individual.
The last thing to say is that economic welfare is strictly linked to the construal
of economic agents as either “bearers of strategies,” or economic agents as they are
“revealed” by their choices.
216

Ibid. pg. 22

82

The next section deals with a different yet coherent theory of agents faced
with choice in general. Game Theory is highly mathematized, and this serves as the
only way to justify the conclusions drawn in economic theory.217 Because there is
much resistance in economics to moving away from mathematically intensive
theories like game theory, our next task will be to show that other theories might be
able to accommodate the problems that game theory as rational choice theory try to
overcome by abstracting from agents, or by trying to axiomatize a system of choice.
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6. CHALLENGING NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS, VALUE &
INTENTIONALITY, RECONSTRUCTING SOCIAL ONTOLOGY
One of the main attractions of game theory is its mathematical eloquence and
rigor. Game theorists claim to be able to analyze problems about economic agents
formally through mathematics and derive conclusions about economic agents. Gametheorists seek to explain universal economic behavior. The foundation of this
“universal” economic behavior dates back to the principle of utility, as defined by
Jeremy Bentham, and taken up unchanged by economists today (in its various forms);
the principle of utility states that humans seek pleasure and avoid pain. The language
of game theory is that economic agents seek to maximize outcomes in economic
situations. This is the economic problem that each agent encounters. The task of
each economic agent maximizes utility to his/her end.218 In the history of economic
thought, this maximization starts as quantitative, but because cardinal utility is
internal to the economic agent, the problem is to figure out the whole of economic
agents’ preferences. If we try to figure out every economic agent’s preferences,
assuming that we are able to do this, then we are faced with a problem figuring out
whose preferences will be “the best.” Ordinal utility theory replaces cardinal utility
theory. Ordinal utility theory relies on orderings of things. Game theory makes
substantial use of ordinality to claim that individuals will choose what they prefer,
that their preferences are well defined, and consistent (see above, pg. 78), and finally,
the choices made by economic agents are rational choices. Rationality is strictly
defined as optimization and maximization. In thinking about economic agents, game
218
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theorists neglect important aspects of individuals, social theory, and value. This
section will show that there are other relevant non-mathematical theories about
economic agents, society, and intentions that give rise to choices. Game theory as a
theory of the individual, as a social theory, and as a theory of value is untenable.
6.1 The Philosophy of Game Theory
Game theory seeks to explain the whole of human economic interactions. It
focuses on the economic agents’ choices. These choices create a reality that can be
analyzed through “games.” The most famous example of a game is supposed to help
us think about human behavior is the prisoner’s dilemma (see pg. 80 above). The
economic agent’s task is to maximize positive consequences, as in classical
utilitarianism.219 The rise of game theory in the 1940’s with Von Neumann and
Morgenstern sought to “repair” economic theory. The “repair” was to be made by
requiring “rigorous” strictly mathematical formulations. These mathematical
formulations, as (Mirowski 2002) argues, are simply elaborate formulations without
the least bearing on economic reality. Mirowski’s argument is that game-theorists
seek to relate economics to a game of automata220—that is, a
computerized/mechanized mode of economic decision. Mirowski states that game-
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theorists seek to make economics a “cyborg” science-where a cyborg is an organism
that is part machine—the connection to game theory is that game theory relies on
mathematics to make statements about “human nature.” Mirowski’s argument is
similar to the argument in here—simply taking mathematics and mixing mathematics
into economic theory does not render economic theory true. In principle, economic
theory should see to develop the integration of powerful computations methods
backed by abstract mathematical statements.221 In doing so, one also much consider
what it means to have such a coupling—the “rigorous mathematics” with the abstract
mathematical statements. In neoclassical economics, the coupling of mathematics to
economic theory has become the standard way of theorizing. Mathematics becomes
the source of knowledge and sole apparatus by which justification about economic
theories becomes possible (and true). Mirowski insists that the only possible proper
justification for game theory is for game theorists to be not only concerned with
philosophical assertions within economic theory. The game theorist, then should be
concerned about history and philosophy of science (as a way to make sure tenable
ontological views are succinctly analyzed).222
When considering economic agents, game theorists are only concerned about
the preference structure of agents. As we saw earlier, the preference structure of an
economic agent refers to the types of things among which the economic agent makes
choices. The preference structure to which game theorists make reference is always
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tractable, and consistent.223 Once the theory is justified with eloquent mathematical
formulations, it is then that game theorists are able to make concrete statements about
the welfare of economic agents. The economic welfare of agents (which is essentially
all the welfare of agents) is characterized by the individual agent’s preference
structure.
The seminal paper by Kenneth Arrow shows that collective decisions are not
easily derivable. Even if it is the case that agents have well ordered preferences, the
whole of economic agents (society) is unable to come to a choice that is definitive.224
Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows it is impossible to come to a situation where all
preferences by all of the members of society are satisfied. Game theory’s statement
on welfare is then to assume that economic agents are accepting of choices that the
whole of economic agents face. Theoretically, if we accept game theory as an
economic theory, we are granting the commensuration of all preferences—that is, we
grant that our preferences are measurable, even if the measure is a set of orderings,
the commensuration of all these preferences give rise to a question of value and
preference. Game theorists, alongside with consequentialists, are able to claim that
through maximization, and the coherent structure of preferences, economic agents are
able to come to a definitive statement about the maximization of economic welfare
for the whole of economic agents. What follows from Arrow’s impossibility theorem
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is that only by a voting system can preferences be satisfied. Arrow assumes a
situation of “non-dictatorship” for the entire social system of preferences to work.
This simply says that no single agent’s preferences influence the preferences of all
other agents in the economy. Thus, all the agents must be in agreement. This is the
best situation of economic welfare. I.M.D. Little argues that even within a voting
system, we are not guaranteed that the outcome be non-arbitrary.225
One further complication that arises about the impossibility of game theory
(hinted at in section 5.1) is the constitution of the individual in game theory. Even
though it seems strange to connect economic agents to automated mathematical
algorithms, this is essentially the aim of game theorists regarding the individual.226
The task of game theory is to explain individuals and the complexity of interaction
among those individuals, coupled with the multiplicity in the world, but ends up
being a “bricolage of algorithms.”227 What game theory actually does is reduce
human behavior to maximization of “value.” This maximization is easily formulated
mathematically. This maximization is related to the rational choices by agents.
These rational choices coincide with choosing a higher ‘value.’ Thus, it is irrational
for an economic agent to choose a value that is less than another available ‘value.’
This is the extent to which game theorists treat value. It is instrumental to agents’
decisions, but it remains abstract, and unanalyzed. The next section shows that
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further analysis of value leads to severe complications for maximization and choices
based on optimization and maximization of value.
6.2 Value, Choice and Economics
What about value is so important to game theory, or even economics? Game
theory depends on value as a quantitative scale upon which all things are measured as
preferences. Value, in its most general sense, is far from constituting merely a
quantitative scale. Value is generally related to some question about “goodness” with
regard to an object or some set of events as in classical utilitarianism. The reason
why value is important in a theoretical analysis in economics is that there are
competing views on value which might affect what is said about economic agents (or
ethical agents—whatever type of agents we speak about). Value theory seeks to
answer some basic questions about value. First, the question of intrinsic value,
something that has its “worth” based on its unique properties. Those properties are
independent of any other properties outside of the object in question. Knowledge, for
example, might be considered an intrinsic good.228 Questions arise on whether there
is one intrinsic good, or many intrinsic good—this is the debate between monists and
pluralists about value. Jeremy Bentham, was a proponent of value monism.229 John
Stuart Mill on the other hand was a proponent of value pluralism. We have seen that
both of these characters are important in the history of economic thought—both of
them have impacted the neoclassical economics paradigm.
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Mark Schroeder explains that there at least three things that need to be
accounted for in order to pursue any theory of value. The first one is ontology of
value. Value pluralists argue that there are different types of values (knowledge and
pleasure might be two distinct intrinsic values). Value monists argue that there is one
and only one value.230
Whether one argues for value pluralism, or value monism one will have to
deal with the what Schroeder calls “revisionary commitments.” Given that monism is
true, how might we explain that there are seemingly different values at work when,
for example we talk about varieties of goodness?231 A knife’s goodness is different
than the goodness of friendship. The monist might have to argue that the value
displayed is no different in kind, but still remains the case how this non-difference in
kind supervenes on two different cases of goodness. Pluralists on the other hand,
have a different problem in that they state that there are different values. So they
would no have a problem explaining why the knife is good vs. why friendship is
good. Their problem arises when pluralists might have to add to their list of “values.”
Thirdly, Schroeder talks about incommensurability as another obstacle for any
theory of value to be enlightening. Incommensurability deals with values that are in
conflict with each other. If monism is true, then incommensurability never happens.
But, as Schroeder states, the fact that we live in a complex world, and the complexity
of situations gives rise to doubts to how much monism holds. If we are to take a
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pluralist view about value, then there must be an explanation as to the status of
conflicting values.232
Game theorists believe (and require) that things are measurable on a single
quantitative scale. This includes the versions of game theory that construe value in
terms of cardinal or ordinal utility theory. Cardinal utility theory states that tastes can
be measured by actual numbers. Ordinal utility theory states that tastes need not be
measured by numbers necessarily, but by rankings—we then refer to the array of
possibilities and naming through which these two types of utility theory as
interchanged with “revealed preferences,” or with “rational choice.” Game theorists
attribute value (used extremely loosely without any philosophical connotations)
merely to be represented by rankings, or numerically. We never get an actual theory
of value except by assumption that given that the choices made by economic agents
give rise to something which “pleases” the agent—going back to different forms of
utilitarianism.233
Recall the definition of value of Jeremy Bentham places man at the mercy of
two sovereign masters: pleasure and pain.234 Bentham then provides a dichotomous,
simple scale of value, that which is pleasurable is good, and that which is painful is
bad. The purpose of humans is to maximize pleasure—and this comes about
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naturally since humans are already under the command of the two sovereign masters.
This is simple construal of value which exists at the core of game theory.
If game theory is to have any credibility with respect to its value claims, it
would need to take on the basic issues of comparability between at least two
conflicting objects, bearers of value. The task of the economic agent in game theory
is prescribed and reduced to the “preferences” of the agent already by design. We are
told that agents choose among the best options available for them. This is clearly a
version of utilitarianism. As argued in section 5.2 above, there is a clear evolution in
the way the economic theory is presented by renaming old concepts—utility becomes
preference, preference becomes “revealed preference.”
Elizabeth Anderson’s Value in Ethics and Economics gives a pragmatic
account of value that will help us with our critique of game theory. Anderson’s
theory consists in an “expressive theory of value.” People have favorable attitude
towards what they deem valuable. Value, for Anderson, is intrinsic, as well as
extrinsic. Extrinsic value deals with the character of something that is valued based
on the characteristics of the object which depend on the person with the favorable
attitude towards the object. Intrinsic value is a bit more complicated to deal with.
Intrinsic value is a type of value that is independent of the person’s attitude towards
the object.235
Concrete examples of intrinsic value, according to Anderson, are people,
animals, and communities. These, she states, we immediately care about and they are
ends for which our actions are guided. Our attitude towards them is immediately
235
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known to be favorable. This makes people, animals, and communities intrinsic
goods. We value intrinsic goods in themselves. What is intrinsically value is the
object of rational favorable attitude.236 Extrinsic goods are primarily means, and are
tied primarily with states of affairs. As stated earlier, extrinsic value is dependent on
some agent’s attitude towards it. 237 States of affairs involve what are called
instrumental goods, that is, these goods are supporting the ultimate end for which all
action is being done. This distinction is important because states of affairs could be
construed as intrinsic values. But it is easy to see that a view like this needs to
collapse the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic value.
Elizabeth Anderson takes on versions of consequentialism, a variant of
utilitarianism which states that people ought to do what brings about the best
consequences for each individual. The best version of consequentialism, according to
Anderson, depends on the use of extrinsic value as the main form of value. That is,
the consequentialist view states that agents maximize a state of affairs that is
[intrinsically] valuable for agents, thus, agents act in ways to bring about this state of
affairs.238 Under this framework, agents are also able to take into account the value of
people, though only instrumentally.239
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A more general description of consequentialism is as follows: 1) agents
maximize intrinsic value, 2) intrinsic value is ascribed to a state of affairs, whereby
the value is independent of peoples desires, intentions, actions, motives, 3) all these
actions, intentions, motives are solely evaluated in terms of their consequences—how
these consequences “embody the best states of affairs,” 4) all values are agentneutral—that is, if it gives everybody a reason to value it.240 In game theory, as
previously discussed, the goal of individuals is to maximize value—the form in which
takes place varies in terminology.
Consequentialist theories justify action merely by showing that agents ought
to do any action maximizes value.241 Elizabeth Anderson looks at her own expressive
theory of rationality to contrast actions under consequentialism vs. expressive theory
of value. Under consequentialism, there is no direction to the intentions of the agent,
except to maximize value via consequences. If we are evaluating the maximization of
value, then the only thing that matters as an evaluative criterion is the consequence of
the action and how well it relates to the best possible states of affairs. Thus, the
agent’s intentions about their actions are not directly linked—and are not a problem
generally. Anderson’s expressive theory of value states that agents have “rational
favorable attitudes” towards intrinsic values. These attitudes translate into action, but
the action is guided by ends. Under consequentialism, the agents are guided by
consequences, which are intentionally or unintentionally maximizing welfare.
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Consequentialism requires that agents have one aim and one aim only: the production
of consequences.242 Consequentialist theories in general make intrinsic value
immediately normative for desire, preference, choice, rules or action. This means that
given a set of intrinsic values, agents are immediately drawn to initiate consequences
that will bring about the maximization of intrinsic values tied preferences, desires,
action, or rules all of which are derived from norms.243 An important distinction
between achieving consequences and intending ends (Anderson’s theory) lies in the
fact that those agents that maximize consequences will have not way to control the
consequences. The consequences are either intended or unintended, for
consequentialists, this will have no importance. Anderson’s point is that when we try
to evaluate an agent’s intentions about a particular end, we will be in at odd
determining what actually the agent’s intentions were. Furthermore, if we are to
maximize consequences only, it is not guaranteed that the consequences will always
be the best state of affairs possible. Anderson argues primarily against this type of
theorizing because of the lack of scrutiny of agent’s intentions. Consequentialist
theories are committed to having even the unintended actions which are actually bad,
to coincide with the agent’s “intention for the best consequences.”
To give a clearer example borrowed from (Reshotko 2006), when we see an
action, it is possible to trace what the ultimate intention of agents. For Reshotko,
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet illustrates that all desire is for the “actual good.”244
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In the case of Romeo, we see that he desires to be with Juliet. Given that he thinks
that Juliet is dead, Romeo decides to drink the poison thinking that Juliet is dead. As
the audience, we see that Romeo does not wish to drink the poison while Juliet is
dead, thus he only drinks the poison thinking that Juliet is dead, therefore, Romeo
only does what seems best, and not actually what is best. In retrospect, Reshotko
argues that theories which ignore or omit desire commit themselves to stating that
agents desire what seems best, and not actually what is best. In the case of
consequentialist theories, cases like these are problematic because the best
explanation we are able to give regarding human motivation is that we intended what
is best without any mechanism with which to retrospectively analyze agents’
intentions.245 Anderson and Reshotko concur in investigating agents’ intentionality to
steer away from any abstract version of intentionality. Reshotko and Anderson agree
that an agent’s intentions must be accounted for with every action and choice that an
agent takes. Urquhart (2005) further states that the point of having agents have real
subjective tastes, preferences, and choices is part of being an individual, and no
longer merely an atomic agent.246
Consequentialism’s “advantage” over other theories, according to Anderson is
its acontextuality—consequentialists can state that their “maximizing of value can
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take place in any context independent of history, thus acontextuality is ahistoricality.
It is in this form that consequentialists are able to state their claims about
maximization of value. The main problems, as stated by Anderson include:
that [practical] reason can settle all questions about what to choose; that it
requires the global maximization of value; and that the grounds for rational
choice must be fully and decisively articulable, leaving no room for judgment
and hence none for dispute.247
The first sentence states that everything is measurable under one scale, meaning, there
are no instances of incommensurability. The second statement states that not only
everything is measurable under one scale, this is the only scale of measurement—that
is, it is a monistic theory of value. Consequentialists and game theorists248 would
dismiss Moore’s non-natural monism as unattractive because it is overtly
metaphysical. Another option for game theorists is to side with classical hedonists
who take value to be reducible to pleasures—pleasures could also be construed as
mental states where the levels of endorphin are measured, thus, the more endorphins,
the more pleasure is experienced by the agent. 249 Reducing value to a mental state is
a radical statement. It single handedly reduces all activity as being directed by
pleasure—as the ultimate end. If all human intentionality is reducible to acts for the
maximization of pleasure, then acts which cause pain, but which are only means to
other ends, like running a marathon, are unexplainable, in this view.
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While global maximization of value is untenable, Anderson states that it is
still possible to defend a pragmatic theory of comparable value. A pragmatic theory
of value deals with trying to commensurate things in terms of extrinsic value, and
without assuming that agents maximize value globally. What ultimately must be
claimed under this pragmatic theory of value is the need for a universal measure, only
an objective standard which deals with comparing value. Some offer “brute
preferences” as the justification of having universal scales which are objective.250
Others justify the need to choose between two goods like money and life, “preferably
in terms of money.”251 The seeming “advantage” of having such theory would
eliminate the problems of incommensurability generally.252
The extent to which the comparative theory of value can be used is for athletic
activities, which require “goodness-of-a-kind” judgments. Goodness-of-a-kind
judgments are statements about of value of a certain activity, a triathlon. The
properties of the athlete’s performance are judged objectively by the set of rules that
exist to do so. Because there are a myriad of athletic activities, Anderson states that
the comparative theory of value necessitates a plural interpretation of value. That is,
a theory of value that does not reduce value to a specific thing, such as pleasure, or an
action or a consequence.253 The second outcome of a comparative theory of value is
that we are able to make sense of personal judgments of what option is best. Personal
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judgments about what is best are construed with a “multi-criterion evaluation” from
impersonal goodness-of-a-kind judgments. These personal judgments constitute, but
are not limited to athletic activities, but also incommensurable goods, or goods that
cannot be deemed to be better than the other when compared.254
Elizabeth Anderson pragmatic theory of value does not go far enough in
dealing with the problems at hand with value. She does start with a distinction of
intrinsic vs. extrinsic form of value. She allows for incommensurability but, once
again, her critique of consequentialism only goes so far. Anderson only asserts that
when we have incommensurability, the objects in question might be in a sense
“equal” to each other. But this “equality” is not able to tell us whether one choice
was warranted whereas other choice might have not been. Elizabeth Anderson’s
objections to rational choice theorists do not go far enough for either rational choice
theorists, or consequentialists to be worried. If we are to have a theory of value and
choice, with regard to that value, what else to we have to account for?
Ruth Chang posits the problem in a different way very close to the problem of
incommensurability. Incommensurability, as we have already said with a situation in
which to objects are in conflict with respect to value. For Chang, incommensurability
does not entail incomparability. In fact, Chang states that there is no
“incomparability” generally.255 That is, even if two objects aren’t comparable in the
traditional sense of “worse than,” “equal,” and “better than,” those objects might still
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have a value relation. Chang is extremely helpful in understanding that our critique
of value in game theory needs to go further than just objecting that game theory only
posits the maximization of value. Justification of choice, according to Chang, is
ultimately what needs to occur in order for us to judge if our choices are “sound.”
Even in simple cases such as choosing between coffee and tea, Chang states, we
might have difficulty relating our individual tastes for either coffee, or tea. This
difficulty arises if we begin comparing a hot cup of tea with the hot cup of coffee.
Chang state that, initially, the hot tea and the hot coffee are incomparable. One might
go around in circles citing the texture of either, the taste of either, the quality of either
in order to make a choice.256 What ends up happening, according to Chang, is that
when faced with such choices, agents start to deliberate about the qualities of each
objects until those qualities are “justify” the choice of coffee over tea, or vice-versa.
Chang’s example is that the cup of hot tea that initially was there might now be just
warm tea. How does warm tea compare to a hot cup of coffee. The process making
either coffee or tea less attractive is called a “merit pump.” That is, the initial
characteristics of the cup of tea are devalued such that we make it less attractive to
choose coffee over tea (or vice versa). Chang states that the “merit pump” problem
calls for justification of choice; obviously this justification of choice cannot be adhoc.257
Chang cites seven main arguments for incomparability (of which we will only
cover 4). The first type are arguments from the diversity of value—that is given that
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we have a multiplicity of values, when two of those values come in conflict, then we
have a situation of incomparability. A fatal objection to these types of arguments
deals with stating what Chang calls ‘nominally notable’ comparisons. When we
compare Michelangelo and Mozart, it is true that there is no way to compare these
two with respect to creativity. But when we have a third object of comparison—
“Talentlessi,” it is clear that talentlessi is less talented with respect to creativity to
both Michelangelo and Mozart. If we have continuum of these less talented painters,
Chang states, then we can compare Mozart to these less talented painters.258
The second type of argument for incomparability is the argument from
calculation. These types of arguments state that value is construed quantitatively, or
qualitatively. Value is assigned a type of scale dealing with magnitudes of some sort.
Value judgments depend on “adding” or “subtracting” value from an object.
Arguments from calculation assume that deliberation about values requires a type of
calculation. Then, the objection raised against calculations of value simply asserts
that the whole of value relations among objects cannot rest merely on calculation,
therefore we have incomparability.259 According to Chang, the fact that value
judgments are required to be calculative is misinterpreting, and reducing the structure
of value. The language of calculation is prevalent especially with consequentialist
theories. The obvious objection is that value judgments need not be formulated with
calculation in mind. That is, there are other value relations among objects besides
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more, less, or equal than—deliberation is “calculative in form.” There might be
situations where there is vagueness with respect to what type of value comparison
might be made.260 Another type of comparison that might be made with respect to
two objects is a “nameless value” relation. If we take the case of comparing giving
money to a charity or putting that same money in a retirement account, one has moral
merits whereas the other one has practical merits. When we try to analyze the value
relation among these two things we see that even though were will have to make a
choice, we have will have not way to assign the type of value upon which we are
calling for the comparison—this is a nameless value.261 Arguments from calculation,
then assume that deliberation about value is merely calculative, and because this
calculation is not possible in some cases, there is incomparability.
Arguments from multiple rankings state that there is incomparability when
there is conflict with respect to comparisons that deal with several components.
Chang’s example deals with hiring a philosophy professor. The candidates are
Eunice and Janice. The evaluation for the job will be decided on the candidates’
ability on clarity, creativeness, and competence. Eunice is a clearer writer than
Janice, but Janice is slightly more competent writer. If we take these characteristics,
and rearrange the importance, then we have a conflict between the different ways
among which the selection of the candidates could be made. Given that we have this
conflict of rankings, this type of argument state that we have incomparability. Chang
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posits a possibility, where we might have Eunice*, who might be slightly better than
Eunice by being clearer. Or we might have Eunice+ who is slightly more competent
than Eunice. Yet, it cannot be said that either Eunice* or Eunice+ is better overall
than Janice. Thus, there might be a continuum of possibilities to construe Eunice that
might render the situation comparable.262
Lastly, arguments from small improvements, according to Chang, are the most
powerful types of arguments with respect to trying to demonstrate incomparability.
These arguments state that given two objects, say (Chang’s example taken from
Joseph Raz) a career as a clarinetist and a career as a lawyer; take either career and
improve it by an amount of money; if we improve the clarinetist career by $10, this
makes the career better than the previous version of the clarinetist career, yet we
cannot say that the improved career as a clarinetist is better than the career as a
lawyer, therefore we have incomparability.263 The general form of the argument is
the following: (1) If A is neither better nor worse than B, (2) A+ is better than A, (3)
A+ is not better than B, then (4) A and B are incomparable. The main force of the
argument, states Chang, is between 1 and 3. Even though we might judge that a
series of clarinetists might be better than our initial clarinetist A, it still does not
follow that the series of clarinetists that are better than A are just incomparable to the
career as a lawyer.264 The reason why this argument is powerful relies on what
Chang call the trichotomy thesis—that is, the relation of value among objects or

262

Ibid. pg. 22-23

263

Ibid. pp. 23-24

264

Ibid. pg. 24

103

things is captured by “better than,” “equal,” or “worse than.”265 Problems arise when
we have a relation that might be outside of these three value relations. Chang argues
that there is a fourth relation with respect to value judgments that allows us to
incorporate seeming incommensurability.
The fourth relation with which we might compare two things is parity. In
“The Possibility of Parity” and “Parity, Interval Value, and Choice,” argues that
because of the complexity of value judgments and situations that call upon us to
deliberate on value, acceptance of the trichotomy thesis is not enough to capture cases
in which no direct comparison can be made. Such cases include the vagueness of
value with respect to two or more objects being compared.266 If we take the examples
that we have been using thus far, coffee vs. tea, Michelangelo vs. Mozart with respect
to creativity, the hiring of Eunice vs. Janice for a professorship—it should be clear
that although these cases are hard, we are better off declaring that these are good
cases for parity. If we take the tools of rational choice theory, or adhere to the
trichotomy thesis of value relations, we are pushed to admit that these cases are cases
of incomparable. It is arguably the case that we are on safer ground stating that these
cases are cases of parity. Parity allows us to have the most complex situations of
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comparison without having to resort to admitting incomparability or merely asserting
parity. If we take the model of consequentialism, or the model of game theory, vs.
Chang’s model, we see that Chang’s model captures every possible case, theoretically
or in real life.
The last caveat for talking about value relations is about incomparability vs.
non-comparability. Incomparability is a substantive claim with respect to the
composition of value of a certain object. Chang’s example for non-comparability is
“gustatory pleasure” with respect to chalk. When we compare the taste of chalk to
the taste of food, we don’t have a case of incomparability, but non-comparability.
Non-comparability relates to the absence of “covering-value.” The covering value for
food is “gustatory pleasure.” But even in cases where we might not have a named
covering value, we will have to make comparisons and choices. This seemingly
trivial caveat is important because even in cases of non-comparability, since no
relation can be established, we will end up in the territory of vagueness one way or
another, and as we have argued, judgments about vagueness with respect to value are
better understood by using parity as Chang has suggested.
Up until this point, we haven’t talked about the consequences for
maximization of value (or even optimization). Given that we have hard cases of
comparison, where we might declare that the relation of comparison is parity, how are
we to maximize, or even optimize? This puts heavy doubts on the game theoretical
project of “agent rationality” and maximization of value. Hsieh (2007) argues that we
might not have to give up maximization that easily as a result of Chang’s argument
for parity. Hsieh observes that Chang’s analysis requires rejecting the axiom of
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transitivity.267 Hsieh states that this rejection is to high a cost to pay.268 Hsieh’s view
states that
Optimization requires the choice of an alternative that is at least as good as
other alternatives and rules out the possibility of justified choice between
incomparable alternatives. In contrast, maximization only requires the choice
of an alternative that is not worse than other alternatives. Because
incomparable alternatives qualify as not worse than one another,
maximization allows for justified choice between them269
Hsieh argues that when comparing to options, we need not incur the cost of rejecting
the axiom of transitivity. Hsieh think that maximization is a viable option even in
hard cases.270 Although Hsieh is in disagreement with Chang about the
maximization, in cases of vagueness, it is hard to see how the axiom of transitivity
cannot be rejected. Take any of the cases. This is an obvious objection to Hsieh
(2007). This is surprising because Hsieh refers to John Broome (on vagueness).
According to Hsieh, choosing a less paying musical career (taken from Chang), might
make sense, and yet, we might have a case for maximization. But the whole point of
calling upon parity for such cases is that there can be an array of formulations that for
which we must account. If we take our musical career we might argue that there are
several configurations about the musical career that are on a par. If we take one
aspect of the musical career, say a continuum of pay, it is clear that as Hsieh state, we
will be able to decipher those that are “not worse,” therefore, maximization holds
there. But when we have aspects of talent, creativity and the like, adding continua
267
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with respect to these will make it a lot harder for “maximization” to hold without
invoking parity.
This section dealt with the justification of choice with respect to value. It is
clear that an array of choices among seemingly incomparable things present a
problem for the “agent rationality” of game theory. Elizabeth Anderson’s critique
only brought us so far against this “agent rationality” and maximization of value.
Hsieh (2007) provided a way that we might construe “maximization” without
referring to parity in order to justify choice. The conclusion to be drawn is that if we
are able to account of all possible cases of comparison, we are left with
incommensurability and vagueness if we accept the project advanced by classical
utilitarianism, game theory, and neoclassical economics.
6.3 Intersubjectivity in Economics, Structures and Agents
Over the course of this paper, we have seen that that the main attraction of
neoclassical theory has been its simplicity, and seeming coherence. This simplicity
has allowed for interesting, yet radical statements about human interactions, and
intentions. Neoclassical economic theory presents to us the atomic individual. This
atomic individual’s sole purpose is to maximize utility, in whatever formulation, or
context in economic theory. Reality is radically different from mere atomic
individuals acting in isolation. Neoclassical theory does not account for the fact that
individuals do interact. Instead of having a harmonious whole, as is the case in
neoclassical economic theory, we have a complex, interacting, and dynamic whole
about which much more needs to be learned.
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When it comes to individual agents, (Davis 2002) proposes that agents are
embedded in the complex social whole. Agent’s choices, intentions, and interactions
depend on a social structure that predates any type of completely independent, atomic
individual. The social structure, in turn, is affected by the decisions individuals
make—thus, there is a reciprocal dynamic relationship between individuals and
society.271 Davis states that individuals are able to have “we-intentions” which are
the foundation of reciprocal behavior of economic agents.272 (Fehr and Falk 2002)
further Davis’ view by stating that atomic individuals that act on their own behalf, as
maximizers of value, do not thrive in a competitive environment. Rather, reciprocal
fairness places a halt to neoclassical theory and its claim of only self-interested
individual maximizing value.273
In “Flaws in the Foundation, Consumer Behavior and General Equilibrium
Theory,” Frank Ackerman critiques what lies at the core of neoclassical theory
(which also applies to game theoretical formulations). Agents are asocial, they have
insatiable or unlimited wants, and consumer choices are informed by well-ordered,
well-informed desires about the commodities in general. All three assumptions are
easily refuted by: intersubjectivity—people are complex individuals hardly reducible
to atomic agents; advertising and group peer pressure, consumption patterns are
affected by these in non-trivial ways; and finally, when people consume, they stop
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after the particular wants or needs are satisfied. Consumers don’t consume all the
food until the fridge is empty.274 In terms of general equilibrium theory (briefly
discussed above), neoclassical theory states that economies tend to equilibrium via
the competitiveness of economic agents. This competitiveness allows for a market
clearing situation where prices and quantities produced in the economy are
determined.275 Furthermore, this equilibrium situation is stable. The reality is
different from this. As Ackerman states, there are two complications in economic
theory which do not permit economic stability such as posited in neoclassical theory:
“one involves aggregation, and the other concerns the behavioral model of the
individual. Both are causes of instability of general equilibrium.”276 Ackerman
suggests repairing the flaws at the foundation of neoclassical economic theory. What
this amounts to changing the three assumptions that arise in consumer theory which
plague the whole of neoclassical theory:

While it [the new theory] might still involve some mathematical analysis, the
variables would be different, representing human needs, desires, and
experiences rather than commodities. Abstract proof of optimality of any
particular market outcome would be unlikely. Instead, evaluation of
economic systems would involve history, politics, and recognition of the
intersubjective nature of human behavior. It would involve ethical judgments
about what our society has achieved, and what else it could have done. […] in
short, many contemporary economists would conclude that such a theory was
not really economics.277
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(Pfouts 2002) suggests that neoclassical consumer theory, which lies at the foundation
of current mainstream economic analysis be discarded for a new “ontology [that] can
always be stated in epistemological terms.”278
The word ontology refers to the study of existence and to the study of the
being of beings. In the context of economics, ontology refers to how economic
agents behave, and how institutions might affect that agent behavior.279 The purpose
of having an explicit ontology regulates the way in which statements about beings are
made. Having an explicit ontology of the consumer, according to Pfouts, “dissolves
the mystery” of statements about beings about which the theory speaks.280 Pfouts
concludes:
Too often economic theorists have not adopted logical methods appropriate
for investigating the economic world, but instead have assumed an imaginary
economic world that submits to the logical methods they want to use. They
have preferred to abandon the world in favor of their preferences in
mathematics rather than using mathematical and other methods that are
effective in analyzing the real world.281
Herein lays the core of this whole discussion. Neoclassical methodology in whatever
form, makes radical claims that go against the common occurrences of the “real
world.” That is not to say that their theory is entirely untrue. The lack of
consideration of ontology (among others) makes mainstream economic theory suspect
as a theory that pertains to the “real world.” As it is stated by Pfouts, mathematical
277
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rigor is not a substitute for ontology. Arguably, mathematicians have their own
issues dealing with the ontology of mathematics on their own. Adding persons to the
picture, not only makes the problem of ontology more complicated—the problem
necessitates philosophical considerations beyond the use of mathematics to justify
economic statements.
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7. Conclusion
Throughout the whole of this discussion, we saw that mathematics is used as
the main source of justification for mainstream economic theory. Mathematics is
supposed to provide a secure foundation for economists, but as we saw in sections 2
and 3, mathematics is inherently metaphysical. The type of metaphysical system will
affect the types of statements that economists/scientists will be able to make in
articulating their theories; in economics, the way in which we construe the individual
and the economy will drive the research and the results derived from that research.
Stating clearly the metaphysical system, in whatever context, allows to clarify and to
anticipate problems that lie at the foundation of economic, as well as other forms of
analysis. Without such considerations, we are left in hands of obscure, drastically
simplified metaphysical claims. The neoclassical theory of the individual, as well as
general equilibrium are examples of neoclassical economic theory where neoclassical
economists, in trying to escape metaphysics, adhere to outdated and improbable
metaphysical statements about the individual and the economy as a whole. If one is
to escape metaphysics, one has to realize that one is already using metaphysical
statements the moment mathematics and mathematical economics are invoked.
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